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0 VER THE PAST twenty years, mass tort actions have
become pervasive in the American legal system. The
term "mass tort action" may include mass disaster ac-
tions,1 toxic torts,2 and traditionally defined mass torts,
such as actions related to asbestos exposure. Frequently,
these actions are multistate, involving either injuries to
people domiciled in different states4 or countries,5 or sim-
I Mass disasters are those resulting from multi-victim, single-occurrence events
such as aircraft crashes, bus accidents, and train accidents. See, e.g., In re Air
Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981) (271 persons perished in the crash of an American Air-
lines DC-10 aircraft); In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, Aug. 2, 1985,
720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (137 people perished in the crash of a Delta
Airlines L- 1011 aircraft).
2 Toxic tort actions generally arise from the release of hazardous substances
into the environment causing physical harm to persons living in the vicinity of the
release. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(discharge of hazardous substances into the ground causing contamination of
ground water which fed residential wells); In re Love Canal Actions, 92 A.D.2d
416, 460 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (dumping of hazardous waste in a
landfill over which residential homes were later built).
Mass torts may be defined as "multiple occurrences of various related harms
over time." Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A PrNoposed Federal Proce-
dure Act, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1039, 1044 n. 19 (1986). Examples of mass torts as used
in this sense include exposure to asbestos, see, e.g., Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
356 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES), see,
e.g., Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, 595 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.H. 1984); and use of
an intrauterine birth control device, see, e.g., Rosenfeld v. A. H. Robins Co., 63
A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196, appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301,
413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
4 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., Jan. 13, 1982, 559 F.
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ilar injuries occurring over an extended period of time to
persons living in different states. 6 In addition, these ac-
tions often are filed in federal district courts on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction, thus lending a further element of
multistate interests. This multistate aspect of mass tort
actions inevitably leads to choice of law problems.7
At the same time, the past twenty years have brought
about a dramatic shift in state court approaches to choice
of law problems. While choice of law problems are not
new, for the most part courts have traditionally resolved
these conflicts based on a vested interest theory solidified
in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws published in 1934.8
The First Restatement instructs that choice of law issues in
torts should be handled with reference to the lex loci delicti
or place of the wrong.9 Almost from its inception scholars
and commentators have criticized the First Restatement's
approach as being too rigid and mechanical in applica-
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983). The lawsuits consolidated in this action involved domi-
ciliaries of at least seven different states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 340-
41.
5 See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (estimating that this accident involved claims by persons domiciled in
twenty-four different countries and twelve different states).
6 See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 1988) (in this
action alone, 1,180 claims had been filed against a drug manufacturer in 844 mul-
tidistrict cases alleging that ingestion of its product by pregnant women resulted
in birth defects in their offspring), cert. denied, sub nom. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794
F.2d 710, 713 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (estimating that between 1970 and 1986 over
600 lawsuits had been filed against this particular manufacturer alone for DES-
related illnesses and diseases) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); Forty-Eight Insu-
lations, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 385, 388 n. 1 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (as of September 5, 1978, 517 personal injury suits had been filed against a
single distributor for asbestos-related illnesses and diseases).
7 See generally Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice
of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in
the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457 (1989) (arguing that choice of law problems
should be resolved by resorting to a limited generosity class action and by apply-
ing the substantive law of the defendant's principal place of business to the is-
sues); Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96
YALE L.J. 1077 (1987) (proposing that Congress enact a federal choice of law stat-
ute to govern the issues in multidistrict mass tort litigation).
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT].
Id. § 384; see infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
FIRST RESTATEMENT.
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tion. 10 These scholars have promoted various "solutions"
to this rigidity problem,"I and state courts facing choice of
law situations have recently started to adopt many of the
proposed alternatives.
This Comment addresses the most common choice of
law issues facing courts in the context of mass tort actions.
Part II analyzes the choice of law approaches or rules
presently used in courts throughout the United States. 2
These include the traditional rule of lex loci delicti,13 Cur-
rie's governmental-interest analysis,' 4 the center of grav-
ity or grouping of contacts test devised by New York state
courts,' 5 the choice-influencing considerations favored by
Robert Leflar,' 6 and the most significant relationship ap-
proach adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.' 7
Part III addresses specific choice of law issues facing
courts in mass tort actions. The major problems in this
area are those relating to the imposition of punitive dam-
10 See e.g. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAw PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A Restatement of the Lex Fori Approach, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965).
11 For example, Professor Ehrenzweig favors the lexfori approach, see infra note
12, and Professor Currie devised the governmental-interest analysis, see infra notes
62-78 and accompanying text.
12 Another approach, lexfori, is used in only two states, Kentucky and Michigan.
See, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) ("The basic
law is the law of the forum, which should not be displaced without valid rea-
sons."); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 406, 320 N.W.2d 843,
854 (1982) ("[In Michigan courts, the courts will apply the lexfori, not the lex loci
delicti, and we do so without reference to any particular state policy.") Because of
the limited use of this test, it is not discussed in this Comment. In addition,
neither Kentucky nor Michigan have addressed a mass tort action involving choice
of law problems.
1: See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text for discussion of the traditional
rule.
1 See infra notes 62-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the govern-
mental-interest analysis.
,- See infra notes 107-122 and accompanying text for a discussion of the center
of gravity test.
-6 See infra notes 131-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choice-
influencing considerations approach.
,7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]; see infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the most significant relationship approach.
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ages, "'8 the application of statutes of limitation and bor-
rowing statutes,' 9 and the availability of a cause of
action.20 These issues are examined from the perspective
of state and federal courts applying the various choice of
law tests. In general, there are a bewildering number of
choices, combinations, and permutations. The applica-
tion of different approaches to these issues frequently
leads courts to different conclusions about which state's
laws should be applied under a given set of circumstances,
with a few notable exceptions in the area of mass accident
litigation.2'
II. CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES
Choice of law problems arise in the area of torts when a
court determines that the laws of more than one state
could apply to the cause of action or to a particular issue
in the action. In a typical automobile accident case, the
plaintiff is injured in one state while domiciled in another.
If the plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, the
question often centers on whether or not the defendant
can rely on the defense of interspousal immunity. If the
state where the accident occurred permits this defense but
the state of the parties' domicile does not, the court faces
a conflict between two competing and contradictory state
laws. 2 The court must then look to its own choice of law
rules to determine which state's substantive law is to be
properly applied to the issue.
18 See infra notes 182-250 and accompanying text for a discussion of punitive
damages.
,9 See infra notes 251-346 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutes of
limitations and borrowing statutes.
20 See infra notes 347-393 and accompanying text for a discussion of the availa-
bility of a cause of action.
' See Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 594 and Air Crash Disaster at
Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 333 (both federal courts, after exhaustive analy-
sis, chose to apply the law of the place of injury to the issue of punitive damages to
avoid complicated trial proceedings).
22 There are numerous cases involving this fact pattern. See, e.g., Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Nelson v. American Employers'
Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 252, 45 N.W.2d 681 (1951); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248,
234 N.W. 342 (1931).
This choice of substantive state law is fairly straightfor-
ward when a state court is applying its own state's choice
of law rules. The situation becomes more complicated,
however, when suit is brought in a federal court. In Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 23 the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that when a federal court acquires jurisdiction
over an action based on diversity of citizenship it must ap-
ply the substantive law of the state in which it is sitting.24
Three years later, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufac-
turing Co. ,25 the Court extended the Erie holding to require
a federal court in this situation to apply the substantive
law of the state in which it sits, including that state's
choice of law rules.2 6
This background is essential to an understanding of all
choice of law issues in mass tort actions. Since each state
is free to adopt its own choice of law rules and federal
courts sitting in diversity actions are required to follow
those rules, it is necessary to look at the various ap-
proaches used by courts today. Simply identifying the ap-
proach of a particular court, however, does not
necessarily make application of the test straightforward.
In a much quoted passage, one court has stated that
[t]he law on "choice of law" in the various states and in
the federal courts is a veritable jungle, which, if the law
can be found out, leads not to a "rule of action" but a
reign of chaos dominated in each case by the judge's "in-
formed guess" as to what some other state than the one in
which he sits would hold its law to be.2 7
23 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
V4 Id. at 78. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." Id.
2- 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
26 Id. at 496. "The conflict of law rules to be applied by the federal court in
Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts." Id. The
Court recently affirmed Klaxon in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S.
3, 5 (1975) ("The conflict-of-law rules to be applied by a federal court in Texas
must conform to those prevailing in the Texas state courts."); see also Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (federal court must follow the substantive laws of
the state in which it sits when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship).
' In re Paris Air Crash Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(emphasis added).
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Thus, merely identifying a particular set of rules does not
lead to the conclusion that the rules are applied even-
handedly or consistently.28
A. The Traditional Rule
Courts using the traditional rule for resolving conflict
211 Compare In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, sub
nom. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989) with
Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 548 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In deciding
their choice of law dilemmas, both courts applied the most significant relationship
test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), as the choice of law for the states in which they
sat.
In Bendectin Litig., perhaps because of the complexities of the case, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied only Ohio's choice of law rules, despite the fact
that many of the cases had been filed originally in other jurisdictions and were
consolidated only for pretrial and trial purposes. The court determined that
Ohio, as the place of manufacture of the product involved in the suit, had the
most significant relationship with the substantive issues. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d
at 305. Other factors such as the domiciles of parties and places of injury were
considered irrelevant. Id.
In Wetherill, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois engaged in a
more complete analysis of the most significant relationship test and determined
that Illinois, as the place of injury, had the most significant relationship with the
substantive issues. WetheriU, 548 F. Supp. at 68. Here also, the domiciles of the
plaintiffs were not considered significant. Id.
Other cases applying the most significant relationship test to similar fact pat-
terns stress different factors in determining the place having the most significant
relationship with the substantive issues. See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
673 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Mo. 1984). The court held that "[a] disease has no signifi-
cant relationship to the place of one's residence." Id. Rather, the place where the
parties' relationship was centered, in this case the place of employment, was held
to be the place with the most significant relationship to the issues. Id. But see In re
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass.
1975). Here, the court, applying the most significant relationship test to some of
the claims in the action, held that "Vermont has a strong interest in assuring that
next of kin are fully compensated for the tortious deaths of residents." Id. at
1112. For a discussion of the most significant relationship test, see infra notes
146-155 and accompanying text.
In other cases, the courts give little, if any, indication of the method used to
determine which state's substantive laws should be applied. See, e.g., Plummer v.
Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987). Here, the court merely stated
that "New York's choice of law rules, which apply to this action . . . dictate that
California substantive law applies because that is the place where plaintiff's injury
occurred." Id. at 355. This statement would appear to indicate that New York
follows the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in resolving choice of law issues. How-
ever, New York abandoned the rule for the more analytical center of gravity test
twenty-four years prior to the holding in this case. For a discussion of the center
of gravity test, see infra notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
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of laws issues in tort actions apply the law of the state in
which the activity giving rise to the action occurred. 29 An-
other way to phrase this is that the court will apply the lex
loci delicti. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws 30 embraces
this rule, heavily influenced by the vested rights and terri-
torial prerogatives philosophies of early twentieth century
theorists.'
The vested rights theory focuses on the operation of
law in space. 2 Space is viewed as that geographic area
within which a sovereign state has the authority to impose
its laws. 33 A state cannot enforce its laws outside its terri-
tory but has every right to do so exclusively within its
boundaries.3 4 Thus, the initial issue is the determination
of the legal rights the state has created and to whom those
rights attach or extend.35 Once a right exists, that right
follows a person everywhere, even across state bounda-
29 Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. at 342. "[Tlhe law governing the creation
and extent of tort liability is that of the place where the tort was committed." Id.
so FIRST RESTATEMENT § 378. "The law of the place of wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal injury." Id. Section 378 comment b states:
"Whether a particular harm which a plaintiff has sustained constitutes an injury
for which he may recover compensation is determined by the law of the place of
wrong." Id.
3 See, e.g., J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); A. DICEY,
CONFLICTS OF LAws (5th ed. 1932). Justice Holmes was also a major proponent of
the vested rights theory which permeated many of his opinions. See, e.g., Slater v.
Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234
U.S. 542 (1914).
32 J. BEALE, supra note 31, § 1.1. "The branch of the law called for convenience
The Conflict of Laws deals primarily with the application of laws in space." Id.; see
also Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 361 (1945). "Conflict of laws deals primarily with the application of law in
space .. .. " Id. at 379.
3. J. BEALE, supra note 31, § 4.12. "Law operates by extending its power over
acts done throughout the territory within its jurisdiction .... ." Id. See also
Cheatham, supra note 32, at 379. "Legal rights are created by the operation of law
on acts done in the territory within its jurisdiction . I..." d.
34 See FIRST RESTATEMENT § 1(1). "No state can make a law which by its own
force is operative in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state is its
own law ...." Id. "A state has no power to create rights or interests beyond its
boundaries, but ... it has the power to create some interests which will be recog-
nized as valid in other states." FIRST RESTATEMENT § 42 comment a. See also
BEALE, supra note 31, § 4.12. "By its very nature law must apply to everything and
must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its jurisdiction." Id.
I See Cheatham, supra note 32, at 379. "The fundamental inquiry, therefore, is
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ries. 6 Another state has a legal obligation to recognize
the right created in the state in which it arose. 7 Applica-
tion of the vested rights theory allows a court to focus on
a single issue, theoretically leading to uniformity and pre-
dictability in application of legal rights wherever enforce-
ment is sought.3
In applying this theory to a tort action, the forum court
will focus on the location of the place where the last act
necessary to give rise to a cause of action occurred.3 9 In-
variably, this is the place of injury or wrongful death.
Once the place of injury has been determined, the law of
that state will be applied to the cause of action regardless
of any interest the forum may have in the outcome of the
case.
40
what right could a law create, and what was the law applicable at the time of occur-
rence ... ." Id.
.16 See Slater, 194 U.S. at 126. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found
that "[tihe theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was
subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation.., which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the per-
son may be found." Id.
37 See J. BEALE, supra note 31, at 1969. "A right having been created by the
appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere." Id.
See also FIRST RESTATEMENT § 384 stating: "If a cause of action in tort is created at
the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. If no cause
of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any
other state." Id.
This general proposition, however, ignores the principle of comity by which a
foreign law is given recognition only by permission of the forum. See Cheatham,
supra note 32, at 374 (stating that in conflict of laws, the term comity refers "to the
action of the courts of one nation or state when asked to use a law to enforce the
judgment of a court of another nation or state").
38 See, e.g., Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). In reaffirm-
ing its adherence to the rule of ex loci delicti, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated
that "[a] virtue of the rule ... is the predictability and certainty as to which state's
tort law will govern." Id. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
39 FIRST RESTATEMENT § 377. "The place of wrong is the state where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." Id. See also
H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1949). "The tort is
complete only when the harm takes place, for this is the last event necessary to
make the actor liable for the tort." Id. at 263-64.
40 See, e.g., J. BEALE, supra note 31, § 391.1. "The law of the place where the
fatal injury was inflicted governs the cause of action for death, not the law of the
place where defendant acted or was negligent, or the place of death." Id.
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Despite overwhelming scholarly criticism, 4' eighteen
states continue to adhere to the traditional rule for resolv-
ing choice of law problems in torts.42 The courts' ratio-
nales for continuing to use this rule are uniformity of
result and predictability of application.43 Some courts
have cited the confusion in the entire area of choice of law
as a reason for retaining the traditional rule.44
The traditional rule can, however, lead to unfair and
unpredictable results in the area of mass torts. For exam-
ple, the disease asbestosis results from repeated exposure
to asbestos-based products over a period of several
years.43 Often the person seeking compensation for this
disease has worked with asbestos products in a number of
different states over many years. If suit is brought in a
court which applies the lex loci delicti rule, the place of in-
jury is open to debate because there is often no way to
determine the place of the last act necessary to cause the
4, See supra note 10 for a partial list of those scholars criticizing the FIRST
RESTATEMENT.
42 Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming apply the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti. See, Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV.
521, 591-92 (1983); Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041
(1987) (updating Kay's research).
4- See, e.g., Hauch, 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
4 See, e.g., Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972). "In our examina-
tion of cases using the 'dominant contacts' rule, we have not been able to discern
that they provide any 'uniform common law of conflicts' to take the place of the
uniform rule of lex loci delicti." Id. at 758.
In a recent mass tort action involving injuries allegedly resulting from use of
DES, the federal district court found that "[t]he Tennessee Supreme Court ex-
pressly has rejected the 'interest analysis' or 'dominant contacts' rule for choice of
law questions." Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 567 F. Supp. 505, 507 (M.D.
Tenn. 1983).
45 Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
The district court noted that
[a]sbestos is generally cumulative; the continued exposure to asbes-
tos dust and fibers increases both the risk and the severity of the
disease. Its latent period makes it legally and medically impossible to
state with certainty when asbestosis was first contracted or which ex-
posure to asbestos caused or contributed to the disease.
Id. at 1355 (emphasis added) (references omitted).
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plaintiff's injuries.46 If this determination cannot be
made, the forum court will not know which state's laws
should be applied to the issues in the suit.
To avoid the harsh results often obtained from applica-
tion of the traditional rule, courts have developed an elab-
orate set of escape devices.47  The devices most
commonly employed in mass tort actions are substance-
procedure characterization and public policy. For exam-
ple, although the First Restatement recognizes the need for
a forum to apply foreign law to a tort action under certain
circumstances, 48 it acknowledges that the laws of the fo-
rum govern all matters of procedure. 49 If the court per-
ceives that application of foreign substantive law will lead
to harsh results in the action before it, it will sometimes-
hold that the issue, while substantive law in another state,
is actually procedural law in the forum state.50 This allows
46 Courts facing this issue have managed to bypass it by assuming that the last
place of employment was the place of the wrong. See, e.g., Leonard v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 309 N.C. 91, 91, 305 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1983) (The plaintiff
"was exposed to asbestos while working at several different locations. His last
exposure occurred ... in the state of Virginia.").
47 The escape devices identified by the commentators include renvoi, subject
matter characterization, substance-procedure characterization, public policy, no-
tice and proof of foreign law, and depe~age. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAws 46 (3d ed. 1986).
48 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
49 FIRST RESTATEMENT § 585. "All matters of procedure are governed by the
law of the forum." Id.
50 See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The Court of Appeals of New York held that the imposition
of punitive damages in a wrongful death action was a procedural matter in New
York, although it was a substantive issue in Massachusetts, the location of the
injury. The court found that while the law of Massachusetts would ordinarily ap-
ply because at the time of this decision New York adhered to the traditional rule
of lex loci delicti in tort actions, it was appropriate to apply New York's rule on
punitive damages. The court's reasoning on this issue was not fully developed. It
merely found that
[als to conflict of law rules it is of course settled that the law of the
forum is usually in control as to procedures including remedies. ...
It is open to us ... to treat the measure of damages in this case as
being a procedural or remedial question controlled by our own State
policies.
Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
The court also used public policy, based on the New York Constitution, to avoid
application of Massachusetts law to this case. Article 1, § 16 provided that "[t]he
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the court to apply its own law to the facts.5'
Courts also do not hesitate to determine that applica-
tion of foreign law may violate some public policy of the
forum,52 despite Judge Cardozo's admonition that public
policy should be invoked to avoid foreign law only when
that law "would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."5 3 In Mizell v.
Eli Lilly & Co. ,4 the United States District Court for South
Carolina determined that lex loci delicti is the choice of law
rule used in South Carolina.5  Because the alleged injury
to the plaintiff occurred in California, the court held that
California substantive law, rather than forum law, should
apply to the issues.56 In Mizell, the plaintiff complained of
injuries suffered as a result of her mother's use of diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy.57 California law per-
mits the use of the theory of market-share liability in DES
cases when the actual manufacturer of the DES used can-
not be identified.5" The court found, however, that al-
right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death,
shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 16. The court held that application of
Massachusetts law which recognized a limitation on the amount of recovery in
wrongful death actions, "is so completely contrary to our public policy that we
should refuse to apply [it]." Kilberg, 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211
N.Y.S.2d at 136.
51 Kilberg, 9 N.Y.2d at 42, 172 N.E. 2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
52 See, e.g., Trahan, 567 F. Supp. at 510. Although North Carolina was the place
of injury and ordinarily its substantive laws would be applied because the forum,
Tennessee, followed the ex loci delicti rule, North Carolina had not adopted a strict
liability theory of recovery in product liability actions whereas Tennessee had.
The court held that there was "such a compelling public policy concern as to
declare this an exception" to the application of the traditional rule and applied
Tennessee law to the action. Id.
53 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
-4 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
55 Id. at 594 ("Under South Carolina choice of law rules ... all matters relating
to the right of action are governed by the ex loci delicti .... ").
.- Id. at 595. The court found that since, according to the plaintiff's complaint,
all events relevant to her injury occurred in California, "California must be con-
sidered 'the place of the wrong' . . . [and] California substantive law should gov-
ern the right [sic] of the parties." Id.
57 Id.
.I Id. "Of utmost significance to the outcome of these actions, this body of
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lowing use of the market-share liability theory of recovery
would violate South Carolina public policy of adherence
to traditional and "fundamental principles of tort law." 59
The court held, therefore, that South Carolina law would
be applied. 60 As a result, the plaintiff could proceed only
against the actual manufacturer. Because the plaintiff
could not identify the actual manufacturer, she could not
recover for her injuries.6 '
B. Governmental-Interest Analysis
Professor Brainard Currie developed the governmen-
tal-interest analysis 62 in response to what he perceived to
be illogical results achieved by employing the traditional
rules for resolving choice of law problems. According to
Currie, "the central problem of conflict of laws [is de-
fined] as that of determining the appropriate rule of deci-
sion when the interests of two or more states are in
conflict - in other words, of determining which interest
substantive law would include the California Supreme Court's adoption of the
novel tort theory of 'market-share' liability .... " Id. Under the theory of market-
share liability adopted by the California Supreme Court, if the plaintiff cannot
identify the manufacturer of a product alleged to have caused her injuries, as long
as she joins in the action manufacturers of "a substantial share of the DES her
mother might have taken," the plaintiff can seek recovery from each manufacturer
joined on the basis of its share of the DES sales market. Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories, 26 Cal.3d 558, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980).
59 Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596. In support of its holding, the Mizell court relied
on an earlier DES case in which the same district court refused to apply the mar-
ket-share liability theory. In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C.
1981), the court held that "[tihe unequivocal law of South Carolina is the plaintiff
in a negligence action has.., the burden of proving that the injury or damage was
caused by the actionable conduct of the particular defendant." Id. at 1018. In
approving this holding, the Mizell court stated that "[tihe Court places the burden
of proof of proximate cause squarely on the plaintiff. Application of this burden-
shifting theory [market-share liability] would violate established public policy."
Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596.
o Id. at 596-97. "Market share liability represents a radical departure from the
body of products liability law that has been developed in South Carolina. . ..
[T]his court will apply the substantive law of the forum, South Carolina, to this
action, since to do otherwise would violate the public policy of this forum." Id.
"iI Id.
62 Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm.
L. REV. 227 (1958).
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shall yield."'6 3 In resolving choice of law issues using the
governmental-interest analysis, Currie insisted that courts
should consider only "the policies reflected in the laws of
the involved states and the interest of each state, in light
of those policies, in having its law applied on the point in
issue .... "-1
Currie proposed that a court applying a governmental-
interest analysis to a choice of law issue use a five-step
process. First, the court should always consider applying
the law of the forum, even when foreign elements are in-
volved in the case.6 5 Second, if it appears that the sub-
stantive law of another state may be appropriately
applied, the court must determine the governmental pol-
icy involved in the law of the forum.66 Next, if appropri-
ate, the forum court should look at the governmental
interest of any other state whose law may be appropriate
for application.67 If the forum state has no interest in hav-
ing its law applied to the issue in the case, the law of the
other state should be used if that state does have an inter-
est which would be sufficiently advanced by having its law
applied. 6  Finally, if both states have an equal interest in
the matter, the law of the forum state should be applied. 9
63 Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 173 [hereinafter Currie, Notes on Methods].
- Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Re-
formulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 182 (1977).
6 Currie, Notes on Methods, supra note 63, at 178. "Normally, even in cases in-
volving foreign elements, the court should be expected, as a matter of course, to
apply the rule of decision found in the law of the forum." Id.
- Id. "When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy
expressed in the law of the forum." Id. Determining the forum's governmental
policy at this juncture is necessary, according to Currie, in order to ascertain
whether, despite the apparent foreign interest in the issues, "the relation of the
forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an
interest in the application of that policy." Id.
67 Id. "If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed
by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the application
of its policy." Id.
- Id. "If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application
of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law." Id.
-' Id. "If the court finds that the forum has an interest in the application of its
policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has
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It is this last consideration, in which both states have an
equal interest, that Currie viewed as a true conflicts prob-
lem. 70  Currie suggested that if equal interests are pres-
ent, the forum court should reconsider the policies or
interests of each state to determine whether a modified
interpretation of one or the other policy would permit the
forum to determine that one state's interests would be
best served by applying its law to the case. 7 1 If reconsid-
eration is not possible, however, then the law of the forum
still should be used. 72 By doing so, the court avoids mak-
ing a qualitative decision on the relative value of each
state's interest which Currie believed to be outside the
scope of judicial authority.73
Central to the governmental-interest analysis is Currie's
unique definition of a false conflict. 4 Ordinarily, a false
an interest in the application of its contrary policy." Id. This was also Currie's
position in situations where the forum has no interest to advance in the lawsuit
but two or more other states do. In these situations, Currie thought that the fo-
rum should apply its own law rather than make a qualitative decision about which
third state's interests would be best promoted by having its laws applied to the
dispute. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1243 (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comments].
70 See Sedler, supra note 64, at 188-89. "Where a reconsideration of the policies
and interests of the involved states persuades the court that the conflict cannot be
avoided by a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest
of one state, the case represents the true conflict... [and] the forum must advance
its own policy and interest and apply its own law." Id.
71 Currie, Comments, supra note 69, at 1242. "If the court finds an apparent con-
flict between the interests of the two states it should reconsider. A more moder-
ate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other
may avoid conflict." Id.
72 Id. at 1242-43. "If upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict be-
tween the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the
law of the forum." Id.
73 Currie, Notes on Methods, supra note 63, at 176. "[W]here several states have
different policies, and also legitimate interests in the application of their policies,
a court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing interests, or evaluate their rela-
tive merits, and choose between them accordingly." Ild. See also Sedler, supra note
64, at 188. But see Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
In Henry, the court of appeals stated that New Jersey employed the governmental-
interest analysis in which "[a] state is deemed interested only where application of
its law to the facts in issue will foster that state's policy," but not on a quantitative
basis. Id. at 32. Rather, "[t]he qualitative nature of contacts is considered." Id.
74 See Sedler, supra note 64, at 186. "When a consideration of the policies and
interests of the involved states leads to the conclusion that one state has an inter-
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conflict arises when the law of the forum differs from that
of another state whose law might be applied to the issue
but application of either law will produce the same re-
sults.75 Under Currie's theory, a false conflict is one in
which only one state has an interest in advancing its pol-
icy.76 Since only one state has an interest, there is no
choice of laws problem.77 Currie was of the opinion that
most choice of law situations involve false conflicts be-
cause it is unusual to find more than one state with a legit-
imate governmental interest worth advancing in a given
lawsuit. 78
Two states, NewJersey79 and California,"° have adopted
est in having its law applied on the point in issue while the other state does not,
the false conflict is presented." Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania em-
ployed this analysis in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964). Griffith involved the limitation of liability in a wrongful death action result-
ing from an aircraft crash. The court held that Colorado, although the place of
injury, had no interest to advance by having its limitation on liability applied to a
lawsuit involving nonresidents because the place of injury was purely fortuitous.
Instead, the court found that Pennsylvania, the domicile of the decedent, had a
greater interest in having its law of liability applied because the state "is vitally
concerned with the administration of decedent's estate and the well-being of the
surviving dependents ...... Id. at 1, 203 A.2d at 807.
75 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., on Jan. 13, 1982, 559
F. Supp. 333, 342 (D.D.C. 1983) (declining to apply a choice of law analysis to the
issue of negligence because "there is no conflict as to the negligence law among
the various interested jurisdictions [so] the Court will apply the negligence law of
the District of Columbia").
76 B. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 726. "A true problem arises only when the laws
of two or more states are in conflict, in the sense that each state has an interest in
the application of its distinct legal policy .... [C]hoice-of-law rules ... are utterly
indefensible when, in application to false problems, they simply subvert the inter-
est of the only interested state." Id.
77 Id. at 189. "When one of two states.., has a legitimate interest in the appli-
cation of its law and policy and the other has none, there is no real problem;
clearly the law of the interested state should be applied." Id.
78 Id. at 582. "The system ought not to concern itself with cases in which there
is no conflict of interests between states. Because of the way in which it is con-
structed, however, it does provide for such cases, thus creating false problems
and, as often as not, solving them badly." Id.
71o Henry, 508 F.2d at 31-32 ("[I1n a series of cases ... New Jersey courts have
adopted the governmental interest approach to choice of law questions."); Beck-
with v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 185 N.J. Super. 50, 50, 447 A.2d 207, 212 (N.J.
Super. Ct. L. Div. 1982) ("New Jersey courts ... [give] strong consideration to the
governmental interest approach.").
go Hurtado v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d
666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). In introducing its analysis of the choice of law
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the governmental-interest analysis for dealing with choice
of law issues in torts. Although California, through the
influence of Justice Traynor, was an early adherent to
Currie's analysis,' the California Supreme Court has
modified its approach to true conflicts situations.82 For
those problems, California employs a "comparative im-
pairment" analysis by which the law of the forum is not
automatically applied. 83 Rather, the court looks at the in-
terests of each state to determine which would be more
impaired if its law were not applied to the issue.84 If the
court determines that the foreign state's interest in its pol-
icy is stronger than that of the forum, the court will apply
the foreign state's law to resolve the issue. 85 Similarly, it
problem in this wrongful death action, the California Supreme Court stated that
"[wle [have] adopted ... a rule requiring an analysis of the respective interests of
the states involved (governmental interest approach) the objective of which is 'to
determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved.' " Id. at
579-80, 522 P.2d at 669, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (quoting Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.
2d 551, 554, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1967)).
,, See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553, 432 P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 33 (1967) ("The forum must search to find the proper law to apply
based upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states.").
.2 See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721,
148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
83 Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
84 Id. The court stated:
[T)he "comparative impairment" approach to the resolution of such
conflict seeks to determine which state's interest would be more im-
paired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.
This analysis proceeds on the principle that true conflicts should be
resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest would be the
more impaired if its law were not applied.
Id. In a later case, the California Supreme Court refined the comparative impair-
ment approach, finding that it "attempts to determine the relative commitment of
the respective states to the laws involved . . . [incorporating] several factors for
consideration: the history and current status of the states' laws; the function and
purpose of those laws." Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 583 P.2d at 727, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 873.
- Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875. In
Offshore Rental, the California Supreme Court faced a choice of law problem re-
garding the plaintiff's recovery for "loss of services of a 'key' employee whom
defendant negligently injured on defendant's premises in Louisiana." Id. at 160,
583 P.2d at 723, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 869. A conflict existed between the laws of
California, the plaintiff's state of incorporation and principal place of business,
which permitted recovery under those circumstances, and Louisiana, the place of
1990] COMMENTS 215
is unclear whether New Jersey ever followed Currie's true
conflicts analysis because the cases indicate that New
Jersey courts, both state and federal, have had no hesita-
tion in applying the law of another state in a true conflicts
situation. 6
Six other states use the governmental-interest analysis
in combination with another method of resolving choice
of law problems. 87 Generally, the most significant rela-
tionship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 88
is combined with the governmental-interest analysis.
Although the governmental-interest analysis requires the
forum to engage in greater examination of the issues than
the traditional test, it too suffers from rigidity and
mechanical application. The main problem stems from
the fact that it is often impossible for the courts in one
state to determine the governmental interest of another
state.819 There is, at least in a mass tort action, a tendency
injury, which did not permit recovery. In holding that Louisiana's law should be
applied, the court stated "[w]e do not believe that California's interest in the ap-
plication of its law ... are so compelling as to prevent an accommodation to the
stronger, more current interest of Louisiana .... Louisiana's interest would be
the more impaired if its law were not applied .... " Id. at 169, 583 P.2d at 729,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
86 See, e.g., Henry, 508 F.2d at 28 (federal court sitting in New Jersey applied the
Quebec statute of limitations to a case involving injuries caused by thalidomide
despite the fact that New Jersey was the home of the manufacturer, thus rejecting
New Jersey's interest in regulating the activities of its domestic corporations).
87 Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington.
Kay, supra note 42, at 593. This author, writing in 1983, also identified Arkansas
as following the governmental-interest analysis, in combination with another ap-
proach. In 1987, however, Arkansas adopted the choice-influencing considera-
tions approach to resolving choice of law issues in tort cases. See Schlemmer v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987); see also Smith,
supra note 42, at 1053-55.
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 6, 145.
89 Compare Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969) with Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965). Both cases involved virtually identical facts. In Dym, plaintiff, a New York
domiciliary, was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by
another New York domiciliary while both were temporarily residing in Colorado.
The court of appeals denied the plaintiff recovery on the basis of Colorado's guest
statute, holding that while New York had an interest in protecting its domiciliar-
ies, Colorado had a greater interest in regulating conduct within its borders.
"Colorado has an interest in seeing that the negligent defendant's assets are not
dissipated in order that the persons in the car of the blameless driver will not have
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to pay lip service to the analysis as an excuse to apply the
forum's substantive law.
One illustrative case is In re Paris Air Crash, March 3,
1974.00 The proceedings arose as a result of the crash of
a Turkish Air Lines aircraft in France."1 Multiple suits
were filed in eleven different United States District Courts
and consolidated for discovery and trial in the District
Court for the Central District of California. 92 Because the
crash occurred in a foreign country and also involved al-
leged strict product liability against two United States cor-
porations,9 3 choice of law problems arose on the issue of
the amount of recoverable damages.9 4
The dictates of Klaxon require a federal court, in cases
based on diversity of citizenship, to apply the substantive
law of the state in which it sits, including that state's
choice of law rules.9 5 In a proceeding comprised of cases
originally filed in different jurisdictions, the court must
apply the laws of the original forums, including ech fo-
their right to recovery diminished by the present suit." Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 124,
209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
In Tooker, plaintiff, a New York domiciliary, was killed in an automobile accident
in which she was a passenger in the vehicle driven by another New York domicili-
ary. The accident occurred while both parties were residing in Michigan. In this
case, however, the New York Court of Appeals permitted recovery even though
Michigan would have barred the claim because of its guest statute. The court
attempted to distinguish its holding in Dym, but conceded that "[t]he primary
point of division in Dym v. Gordon focused ... upon the construction placed on the
Colorado guest statute which, upon reflection, we conclude was mistaken."
Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
See generally Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 392, 393 (1980) (stating that "the discrepancy between governmental in-
terests and actual legislative intent has been overlooked only because, in the vast
majority of cases, legislatures have no actual intent on territorial reach with which
to contrast Currie's results").
399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Id. at 735.
92 Id. at 736.
9. Id.
i- Id. at 739.
.5 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. "We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins... against ... independent determinations [of law made
by federal courts sitting in diversity of citizenship cases] extends to the field of
conflict of laws." Id.
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rum's choice of law rules.96 In Paris Air Crash, without ex-
planation, the court applied California's governmental-
interest analysis to each claim, regardless of the original
forum.9 7 In a confusing explanation, the court first held
that California's choice of law rules relating to damages
required the court to follow the law of the decedent's
domicile at the time of the crash.98 Since the court viewed
this as an overwhelming task,9 9 it proceeded to analyze
the availability of damages collectively on the basis of a
governmental-interest analysis.100 The court found that
California was the only jurisdiction to have an interest in
the measure of damages issue because of its policies of
avoiding the "imposition of excessive financial burdens
on its resident defendants" and providing "a uniform rule
of liability and damages."' 0 ' The court also held that the
- See, e.g., Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 340. "Since
federal subject matter jurisdiction arises from the parties' diversity of citizenship,
[the] Court must follow the choice of law rules of the states where the various
actions were originally filed." Id.
07 Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 741. It is possible the court thought that
Klaxon did not apply in a case involving a possible advancement of a federal gov-
ernment interest, although it does not appear that any of the plaintiffs raised a
federal question in his or her complaint. Nevertheless, the court stated that it
"must consider more than the California governmental interest. It must include
the United States interest in this multi-nation situation ...." Id. at 745 (emphasis in
original).
98 Id. at 741. This conclusion was based on the court's interpretation of the
California Supreme Court's holding in Reich, 67 Cal.2d at 554, 432 P.2d at 730, 63
Cal. Rptr. at 34. This was not the holding in Reich, however. The Reich court
specifically held that "[als the forum we must consider all of the foreign and do-
mestic elements and interests involved in this case to determine the rule applica-
ble." Id. After analyzing all the involved states, the Reich court did apply the law
of the decedent's domicile. This holding does not imply that California courts
would always do so, but rather it clearly indicates that the courts will review each
situation on a case by case basis.
- Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 742 ("How many countries or states are actu-
ally involved as to either claimants or decedents neither the Court nor his staff has
had time to tabulate, and accurate and complete information has not been sup-
plied to the Court by the parties.").
- Id. at 742-45 (discussing various California state decisions applying the gov-
ernmental-interest analysis).
lo, Id. at 743 (Quoting at length from Hurtado, 11 Cal.3d at 584, 522 P.2d at
672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112, the court determined that the three aspects of a cause
of action for wrongful death, compensation for survivors, deterrence of conduct,
and limitation, if any, upon damages recoverable "compel application of the Cali-
fornia law of damages.").
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federal government had a recognized interest because of
its position as the primary regulator of air safety.10 2 Since
no federal statute addressed damages, the court held that
California law would exclusively govern the measure of
damages available. 0 3
Near the end of the opinion, the court acknowledged
that some of the claims had been filed in other jurisdic-
tions and that these filings required the court to follow the
laws of those jurisdictions. 10 4 The court determined, ap-
parently, that this requirement extended only to those ju-
risdictions' laws on damages, not their choice of law
rules.' 05 Upon referring to only one jurisdiction's law on
damages, the court held that none of the other jurisdic-.
tions' laws differed substantially from California's and, in
any event, the interests of California and the federal gov-
ernment outweighed those of any other state or foreign
country.10
6
C. Center of Gravity Test
In contrast to other modern choice of law approaches
which are the product of scholarly reaction to the tradi-
tional rule of ex loci delicti, the New York Court of Appeals
judicially developed the center of gravity or grouping of
contacts test. 10 7 In applying the center of gravity test, the
forum court looks at all jurisdictions having an interest in
the action.'" 8 In theory, those states' contacts are then
grouped together on a quantitative and qualitative ba-
102 Id. at 746 (finding that "the United States has a great concern with (aircraft]
designers and manufacturers of such product").
,- Id. at 747.
Io d. at 749 ("A transferee court is required to follow the laws of the transferor
state in various matters.").
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (contract actions); Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (tort
actions).
lo, See, e.g., Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750
(comparing the contacts of Ontario, the place of injury, and New York, the domi-
cile of all parties).
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sis.' 0 9 The state having the most significant contacts with
the issue under consideration is then determined to be
the center of gravity for that issue and, therefore, the state
whose laws will be applied. "10 The rationale for this test is
cited as "justice, fairness and the best practical result.""'
North Dakota is the only state other than New York to
adopt the center of gravity approach." 2 The test was,
however, very influential in shaping the methodology
adopted by the Restatement (Second)." t3 Unlike the Restate-
ment (Second)'s most significant relationship test, though,
the center of gravity test does not focus on factors such as
ease of application of another state's law or maintenance
of interstate order." 4 Rather, the center of gravity test
attempts to direct the court's attention to the most logical
place where the parties' interests intersect." t5
Id. at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place having the most
interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues aris-
ing out of a particular factual context thereby allowing the forum to
apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with
the outcome of the particular litigation."
Id. (quoting Auten, 308 N.Y. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102).
1o See, e.g., Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466
("Finally we come to the question of which state has the more significant contacts
with the case such that its interest should be upheld.").
11 Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. "Justice,
fairness and 'the best practical result' may best be achieved by giving controlling
effect to the law of the jurisdiction which . . . has the greatest concern with the
specific issues raised in the litigation." Id.
112 Issendorfv. Olson, 194-N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D. 1972) (adopting the "signifi-
cant contacts" approach to apply its own law on contributory negligence to an
out-of-state accident between two North Dakota residents). In its holding, the
court analyzed the relative merits of the center of gravity test and Leflar's choice-
influencing factors approach. Id. at 755. After quoting at length from Babcock, the
court stated, "We adopt with this case the significant-contacts approach as the
choice of law and abandon the lex loci delicti doctrine." Id. at 756.
'is Kay, supra note 42, at 526; see also Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at
283. 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. "The 'center of gravity' rule of Auten has . . . sup-
planted the prior rigid and set contract rules in the most current draft of the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws." Id.
114 See infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND).
1s See, e.g., Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468
(holding that "consideration of where and how a relationship was formed are sig-
nificant" in guest statute cases).
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The New York courts have struggled with their use of
the center of gravity test."t 6 Initially heralded as a method
for avoiding unfair results in situations where the place of
injury is fortuitous,"t 7 application to a given set of facts is
often mercurial. In the first tort cases to which the test
was applied, the Court of Appeals shifted its approach in
each case and produced contradictory results." 8 In a
later series of cases, the court attempted to wed the test to
the governmental-interest analysis. t9 When this proved
unworkable, the court reduced the center of gravity test to
a series of rules equally as rigid as those it had sought to
avoid.' 20 The test has now been reduced to one of contact
counting with little regard for the quality or significance
,,6 Compare Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) with Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 569, 249 N.E.2d at 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 519. In Tooker, the New York Court of Appeals described the center of gravity
test in terms very similar to those used by the California courts to describe the
governmental-interest analysis. "New York's 'grave concern' in affording recov-
ery for the injuries ... [of] a New York domiciliary ... is evident merely in stating
the policy which our law reflects. . . . Michigan has no interest in whether a New
York plaintiff is denied recovery against a New York defendant where the car is
insured here." Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
525.
In Neumeier, on the other hand, the court held that in cases involving out of state
accidents resulting in injuries to New York residents, specific rules were available
to guide the courts in their decisions. "There is, however, no reason why choice-
of-law rules, more narrow than those previously devised, should not be success-
fully developed, in order to assure a greater degree of predictability and uniform-
ity .... Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
117 Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
118 Compare Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 569, 249 N.E.2d at 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 519
with Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 120, 209 N.E.2d at 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 463. Both cases
involved injuries to New York domiciliaries suffered in out of state accidents. The
driver of the vehicle in each case was also a New York domiciliary whose vehicle
was registered and insured in New York. Both accidents occurred while the par-
ties were temporarily residing and attending school in other states. In Dym, the
court held that the Colorado guest statute barred plaintiff's claim against the
driver. Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 128, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470. In Tooker,
the court held that although Michigan's guest statute barred the plaintiff's claim,
it declined to apply the guest statute and, instead, permitted the plaintiff's claim
to go forward under New York negligence law. Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 580, 249
N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
119 See Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1966).
120 Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (listing
three principles to be followed in resolving guest statutes in conflict problems).
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of those contacts to the issue at hand.' 2' Finally, the New
York Court of Appeals continues to contend that in most
tort actions the traditional rule of lex loci delicti applies. 22
The federal courts and lower state courts are left to mud-
dle through their analysis of choice of law issues.
The problems with the center of gravity test are illus-
trated by two cases involving mass tort actions. In Plum-
mer v. Lederle Laboratories,'23 the Second Circuit reviewed a
suit filed in a New York federal district court. The court
of appeals summarily decided to apply California substan-
tive law to the issue of adequacy of warnings about the
effects of an allegedly dangerous product because Califor-
nia was the location where the injury complained of oc-
curred. 24 Proper application of the center of gravity test
may have led to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, the
court engaged in no analysis of the grouping of contacts
required for proper consideration of which state's laws
should be applied to the issue, 25 such as the place of
manufacture and the domiciles of the parties. Instead, the
court seemed to apply the traditional rule. 26
Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York sitting in a diversity action in a mass tort case12 7
followed the lead of the Plummer court and referred only
to the facts that the plaintiff resided in New York and the
injury occurred there in deciding that New York substan-
tive law should apply to a products liability action arising
from an allegedly defective polio vaccine. 28 No reference
12, Id.
122 Id. ("Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where
the accident occurred .... ).
123 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff alleging injury resulting from exposure to a
polio vaccine), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
124 819 F.2d at 355.
25 Id.
6 Id. "New York's choice of law rules ... dictate that California substantive
law applies because that is the place where plaintiff's injury occurred." Id.
127 Jones v. Lederle Laboratories, 695 F.Supp. 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
12 Id. at 705. "[Pllaintiff is a New York resident and the incident giving rise to
this action occurred in New York. Under these circumstances, the parties do not
dispute that New York would apply its substantive law" even though the court
recognized it had jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Id.
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was made to the place of business of the defendant nor to
the place where the corporate decisions giving rise to the
injury were made.' 29 Logically, both of these locations
should be considered in making a decision under the
center of gravity test.130
D. Choice-Influencing Considerations
Robert Leflar first propounded the factors of the
choice-influencing considerations approach for resolving
choice of law problems in 1966. 1' This approach is
based primarily on policy concerns.13 2 Under the choice-
influencing considerations approach, the court looks at
five factors in reaching its conclusion on which state's laws
should be applied to the issue: predictability of result,
maintenance of interstate and international order, simpli-
fication of the judicial task, advancement of the forum's
governmental interests and application of the better rule
of law. '3 3
According to Leflar, in a tort action, the first factor
should have little, if any, impact on the court's decision
regarding which state's laws to apply to the action. 34 In
addition, in a domestic tort action, no international or in-
terstate claims of "sovereign power" exist to cause con-
cern. 3 5  Leflar further believes that a court is quite
capable of applying the laws of its sister states, as long as
129 Id.
See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
"' Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Choice]; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
132 Leflar, Choice, supra note 131, at 277. "Not only the extrastate origin of part
of the facts, but also other state's laws as facts in the forum state's litigation, may
affect the forum's total 'interest' and policies." Id.
I d. at 282.
124 Id. at 310. "Predictability of result .. .is completely irrelevant. Parties do
not plan this sort of tort [negligence actions] with reference to survival rules
.... Id.
1"5 Id. at 311. "In respect to maintenance of interstate order, [in a tort action]
neither state will be much affected or annoyed by what the other state does." Id.
[56
it is able to apply its own procedural rules to the action.3 6
Currently, five states adhere to the choice-influencing
considerations approach. 37 Some of its factors have been
included in the Restatement (Second)'s most significant rela-
tionship test.'38  The choice-influencing considerations
approach is much more proactive than the governmental-
interest analysis because it permits courts to weigh vari-
ous governmental interests and determine their current
importance to each interested state. The approach allows
the court an opportunity to relieve itself of the burden of
an unfair or archaic law if it determines that another
state's law is the better law to be applied.1 39
In Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co. , 40 a products liability ac-
tion based on exposure to asbestos-based products, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether a
successor corporation was responsible for injuries caused
by products produced by a defunct corporation.' 4' Min-
nesota law provided that the successor corporation was
not liable.'4 2 Pennsylvania law, the site of manufacture of
the asbestos products, stated that a successor corporation
was responsible for injuries caused by its predecessor in
interest.'4 The court reviewed the facts of the case in
light of the five factors of the choice-influencing consider-
136 Id. at 288. "There is without question a good reason for a court's applying
its own procedural rules." Id.
1,7 Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Kay,
supra note 42, at 565-66; Smith, supra note 42 at 1053-55, 1138-42.
,s8 Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 315-16 n.1
(1972) (stating that "Professor Leflar's 'choice-influencing considerations' are es-
sentially similar to the factors" of Section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)).
139 Leflar, Choice, supra note 131, at 299-300. "Judges can appreciate . . . that
their forum law in some areas is anachronistic, behind the times, a 'drag on the
coattails of civilization,' or that the law of some other state has these benighted
characteristics." Id.
14o 356 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
14' id. at 381.
'4 Id. at 382. Minnesota adheres to a typical test of corporate successor liability
in which the successor corporation is not responsible for prior obligations unless
it agrees to be.
143 Id. at 382-83. Pennsylvania holds a successor corporation liable under a
product-line rule. That is, if the successor continues to produce a product, it is
responsible for all past, present and future liabilities arising out of that product.
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ations approach.' 4 It determined that application of
Pennsylvania law under the circumstances would provide
predictability in future lawsuits arising as a result of the
predecessor's activities. The court also determined that
Minnesota courts are capable of administering Penn-
sylvania law and, finally, that use of Pennsylvania law
would actually promote Minnesota's governmental inter-
est in providing compensation, while application of Min-
nesota law would not promote this interest.1 45
E. The Approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws has nominally
retained the lex loci delicti test of the First Restatement with
respect to tort actions. 14 6 According to the Restatement
(Second), the law of the place of injury is to be applied to
tort actions unless it is determined that another state has a
more significant relationship with the incident giving rise
to the action.1 47 Determination of whether another state
has a more significant relationship with the activity giving
rise to the injury is reached by applying a two-step analy-
sis to the facts and issues of the case. First, the court re-
views the contacts each state has with the parties, the
place of injury, the place of conduct, and the place where
the parties' relationship was established. 1' 4  Rather than
merely counting contacts to make a determination, the
court weighs the importance of these contacts on the basis
of the issues involved in the action.149
Once the contacts and their importance to the cause of
144 Id. at 381-82. The court did not bother with the better choice of law factor,
however, because it felt that the other factors clearly pointed to application of
Pennsylvania law.
,- Id. at 382-83.
,46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 146.
147 Id. "In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship
." Id.
"" Id. § 145.
14" Id. § 145(2):
[56
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action have been established, the court reviews them in
light of six principles set forth in Section 6 of the Restate-
ment (Second) 150 and makes a final determination as to
which state has the most significant relationship to the is-
sue at hand. These principles include the policies of the
forum, the expectations of the parties, the predictability
of result, the ease of application of the selected substan-
tive law, the policies of other interested states and the or-
der of national and international systems.' 5'
The most significant relationship test combines many
aspects of other choice of law theories in vogue today. It
allows for examination of competing governmental inter-
ests.152 It takes into account the place of the injury.' 53 Fi-
nally, it permits a weighing of all these competing
interests to determine which state's law should apply.154
Conspicuously absent is a requirement that a determina-
tion be made as to the better rule of law. This determina-
tion of the better rule of law is not considered because,
according to the view of the commentators, it inappropri-
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to a tort issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, of the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.
Id.
Io d. § 6.
151 Id. § 6(2).
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law in-
clude: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the de-
termination of the particular issue, (d) the protection ofjustified ex-
pectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
ld.
,.'15 See Reese, supra note 138, at 317; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6.
I- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145(2).
154 Id.
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ately places the judiciary in a legislative role in which the
court can override an applicable state law it considers out-
dated or unfair to the parties. 15
An important part of the Restatement (Second) approach is
the concept of issue splitting or depe~age.156 Use of issue
splitting allows the court to analyze the issues in a cause
of action separately to determine which state's law should
be applied to each. 5 7 This technique is particularly useful
in actions involving the availability of punitive damages
and limitations on the amount of actual recovery permissi-
ble in wrongful death actions.'15  For example, in In re Air
Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973,159 the
choice of law problem involved a number of issues,
among them a limitation on compensatory damages in
wrongful death actions.6 0 The proceedings in this case
were the result of a consolidation of claims originally filed
in several different jurisdictions.' 6 ' Consistent with
Klaxon, the district court held that0"the applicable damage
provisions must be determined in each case by applying
the substantive law of the original forum, including its
choice of law rules."' 6 2
With respect to the limitation on compensatory dam-
1-5 See, e.g., Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679 (1963). "[Tjhe Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral
forum which has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the
most appropriate law." Id. at 692.
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145 comment d. "Each issue is to receive separate
consideration if it is one which would be resolved differently under the local law
rule of two or more of the potentially interested states." Id. See also Reese, Depe-
(age. A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58 (1973). "[Wjith
respect to each issue, the court should seek to apply the relevant rule of the state
which has the greatest concern in the determination of that issue." Id. at 59.
157 Reese, supra note 156 at 60. "[C]ases can be expected to arise with some
frequency where not only do different states have the greatest concern in the de-
termination of different issues but where the relevant rules of these states with
respect to these issues are not the same . I..." d
15, See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d
594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1982); Air Crash Disaster at Washington D. C.,
559 F. Supp. at 338; Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1107-08.
399 F. Supp. J106 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id. at 1107.
,61 Id. at 1108.
Id. Contra Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 732.
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ages, the court reviewed this issue in connection with the
claims originally filed in Vermont 6 3 and Massachusetts."
For the Massachusetts claims, the court held that Massa-
chusetts law limiting the amount of recovery would be ap-
plied to all claims originally filed there because at the time
of this decision Massachusetts adhered to the traditional
rule of lex 166 delicti.'65 In analyzing the Vermont claims,
however, the court applied the most significant relation-
ship test. 66 The court found that Massachusetts' only
contact with the claims was that it was the place of the
aircraft crash. 167 Vermont, on the other hand, was the
domicile of the decedents and the place where the rela-
tionship of the parties was centered. 68 Because of these
factors, the court concluded that Vermont's contacts were
significant. The court further held that Vermont had a
strong interest in having its policy of no limitation on the
amount of recovery in wrongful death actions applied to
these claims.' 69 On the other hand, Massachusetts' inter-
est in having its limitation on recovery statute applied was
considered minimal. 70  After weighing all these factors,
63 Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1108-12.
'- Id. at 1115-16.
165 Id. at 1115. "Massachusetts adheres to the traditional lex loci delicti choice of
law rule in tort cases so that all substantive aspects of a cause of action are gov-
erned by the law of the place where the injury occurred." Id.
- Id. at 1111. Vermont had not previously adopted the most significant rela-
tionship test. The court held, however, because the Vermont Supreme Court had
done so for contracts actions, it would likely do so for tort actions, if the right
issue were presented. The court held that "the widespread rejection of the tradi-
tional rule by other courts... compels the conclusion that the Vermont Supreme
Court would abandon the lex loci rule and would adopt the 'significant contacts'
rule . .. to determine the law governing the damages recoverable in this action."
Id. But see Smith, supra note 42, at 1151. Smith points out that the Vermont state
courts have not had occasion to review a choice of law problem in a tort action in
recent years. In his opinion, "[tihe Vermont Supreme Court has been slow to
adopt a modern choice of law theory. Although the cases are old, they indicate a
continued adherence to lex loci delicti in tort ..... Id.
167 Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1112.
16 Id.
-,9 Id. (stating that "Vermont has a strong interest in assuring that next of kin
are fully compensated for the tortious death of residents").
170 Id. "Massachusetts' sole contact with this litigation is the happenstance that
the accident occurred there. This contact alone is insufficient to support applica-
tion of the damage provision of its statute." Id.
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the court held that, with respect to the no limitation issue,
the Vermont claimants were entitled to have Vermont's
statute applied to their actions. 171
Sixteen states have adopted the position of the Restate-
ment (Second) in dealing with tort actions, 7 2 and many
others use it in combination with one of the other ap-
proaches. The Restatement (Second)'s proponents view the
approach not as a mechanical test, but rather as an ap-
proach requiring analysis on a case-by-case basis. 171 One
problem that arises is that the test is a fairly recent innova-
tion and many state courts have not faced facts requiring
them to accept or reject the approach. As a result, some
federal courts in mass tort actions have taken the matter
into their own hands. 74 These courts have determined
that the courts in the states in which the federal courts sit
would adopt the most significant relationship test if given
the opportunity to do so.' 75 While a federal court is per-
mitted to make such determinations in the face of uncer-
tain direction from a state court, 76 it is argued that this is
171 Id.
172 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Texas. Kay, supra note 42, at 556-57; Smith, supra note 42, at 1051-52, 1059-60,
1095-96, 1121-23.
'7.- Reese, supra note 138, at 315. "By approach is meant a system which does
no more than state what factor or factors should be considered in arriving at a
conclusion. An example of an approach is section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws." Id.
174 See, e.g., Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1111. In this case, the
court applied the choice of law rule of Vermont as well as the choice of law rules
of the other original forums. The district court specifically held that if Vermont
were given the option it would apply the most significant relationship test of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND). Id. See also Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C, 559 F.
Supp. at 361. The court found that with respect to the state of Maryland the rule
of lex loci delicti "no longer has any vitality in that state and that the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland would not apply it [/ex loci delicti] were the instant matters now
before it." Id. at 362. Both courts making these decisions were not sitting in the
states whose choice of law rules they opted to change.
Significantly, two months prior to the Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C. deci-
sion, the Maryland Supreme Court had declined to abandon the traditional rule
for tort action. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).
17. Air Crash Disaster at Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 362; Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1111.
176 See generally Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 137 (D. Md.
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not an appropriate area for the federal courts to exercise
this option.' 77
III. CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES IN MASS TORTS
Due to the number of different choice of law ap-
proaches used throughout the United States, no single ap-
plication of these approaches exists even in those
jurisdictions applying the same approach. To further
complicate matters, the majority of mass tort actions are
filed or removed to the federal court system on the basis
of diversity of citizenship of the parties."" While the fed-
eral courts are obligated to apply the choice of law rule in
force in the state in which they sit, 179 remarkably those
courts often impose new choice of law rules. °80 Even in
those situations where the federal court applies an ex-
isting state choice of law rule, that application is often un-
even or receives only cursory attention by the court.'8 '
This section deals with the three more common situa-
tions in which choice of law issues arise in mass tort ac-
1981) (when a state court has not considered a particular issue of law, a federal
court sitting in that state has the right to determine how the state court would rule
on the issue), aft'd, 758 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1985).
17, See, e.g., Saloomey v.Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983). "There is
no real uncertainty as to what choice-of-law rule Connecticut's Supreme Court
would apply in this case." Id. at 680 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Nevertheless,
the majority abandoned Connecticut's lex loci delicti rule in favor of the most signif-
icant relationship in an air crash case. Id. at 679. The Connecticut Supreme
Court did not abandon the rule until 1986. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201
Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986).
178 See, e.g., Alexander v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 93, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The Court has subject matter jurisdiction.., based on diversity
between plaintiffs ... and defendants .... ); In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston,
Mass., July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1107 (D. Mass. 1975) ("Jurisdiction is
predicated solely on diversity of citizenship.").
179 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). For a discussion
of this holding, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., Jan. 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1983); Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1106.
1", See, e.g., Knaysi. v. A.H. Robins Co., 679 F.2d 1366 (11 th Cir. 1982) (court
applied New York law rather than Florida law with no explanation); Sibley v.
KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (New York federal
district court applied Massachusetts law to a wrongful death action arising out of a
plane crash in the Canary Islands with no explanation).
230 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
tions: the availability of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions, the use of statutes of limitations and bor-
rowing statutes to defeat or permit a cause of action, and
the availability of a cause of action.
A. The Availability of Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death
Actions
In actions resulting from a mass air accident, plaintiffs
frequently seek punitive damages, in addition to compen-
satory damages, from the air carrier and the manufacturer
of the aircraft. The plaintiffs often allege willful miscon-
duct and egregious conduct in the manufacture and main-
tenance of the downed aircraft.'8 2  A number of states
permit the imposition of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions on the grounds that such an imposition de-
ters future tortious conduct of a similar nature, 8 3 encour-
ages corporate accountability,184  and promotes air
safety.' 8 5 Many other states, however, specifically disallow
punitive damages in wrongful death actions.' 86 The poli-
182 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 604
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). In this action, plaintiffs claimed that
the manufacturer of the aircraft engaged in egregious conduct in the manufacture
and design of the aircraft and that the airline's conduct in maintaining the aircraft
was egregious, in order to bolster their claims for punitive damages. Id.; see also
Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 353 ("The primary purpose of
imposing punitive damage assessments is to punish egregious conduct of a de-
fendant and deter future wrongful conduct .... ).
183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1) and comment a (1979). "Puni-
tive damages are.., awarded against a person .. .to deter him and others like
him from similar conduct in the future." Id. § 908(1). See also K. REDDEN, Punitive
Damages § 2.1, at 23-24 (1980); Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1982).
14 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 613. In outlining one state's policy
behind permitting imposition of punitive damages, the court found that the state's
interest in deterring egregious conduct by resident corporate defendants was so
strong that "[t]o find otherwise would be to gut the very concept of corporate
accountability." Id.
185 Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 337. In explaining the
District of Columbia's reasons for permitting punitive damages in wrongful death
actions, the court found that "the policies ...of preventing air disasters and
promoting safe air travel are advanced by ...punitive damage assessments in
actions such as this." Id.
I6 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1990) (permitting re-
covery of punitive damages only in cases "where the defendant has been guilty of
[56
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cies underlying denial of punitive damages include pro-
tection of resident corporate defendants8 7 and avoidance
of excessive liabilities on the part of resident
defendants.'"8
These conflicting policies meet head on in mass acci-
dent cases when the parties are domiciled or have their
principal place of business or operations in different
states, one allowing the imposition of punitive damages
and the other denying recovery for punitive damages.18 9
The court must determine which state's law will con-
trol.' 90 The process becomes more complex when both
the manufacturer and the airline are defendants in the
same action and have their nerve centers in different
states. 19 1 To complicate the problem even further, indi-
vidual cases are often consolidated into a single proceed-
ing and the court, under the dictates of Klaxon, must apply
the choice of law rules for each state in which the actions
oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied .... ). Cases construing Califor-
nia's policy that punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions in-
clude Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 551 P.2d 334, 353,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450,
113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
187 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 614. A state's rule disallowing
punitive damages protects "the economic well-being of the corporations." Id. See
also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). In his
opinion for the court, Judge Friendly was concerned that "the apparent impracti-
cability of imposing an effective ceiling on punitive awards .. .can end the busi-
ness life of a concern ... with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of
their investments for a single management sin." Id.
- Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 610. ("The purpose of denying
punitive damages is to avoid excessive liability.").
119 See, e.g., Freeman v. World Airways, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 841, 842-43 (D. Mass.
1984). The plaintiffs urged the court to apply the law of their state of domicile,
which allowed for punitive damages, while the defendants argued for imposition
of the laws of their principal places of business, none of which allowed for puni-
tive damages. Id.
-9o Id. at 845. "To resolve the conflict in this diversity case, this court must
apply the choice of law rules of the forum states." Id.
, See e.g., Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 604-05. This case involved
two defendants, the manufacturer of the aircraft and the airline. The manufac-
turer had its principal place of business in Missouri, was a Maryland corporation,
and manufactured the aircraft in California. The airline was a Delaware corpora-
tion and had its base of operations for maintenance in Oklahoma. Its principal
place of business was in dispute but was ultimately determined to be New York for
the purposes of this litigation. Id.
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were originally filed.' 92
In In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979, 93 wrongful death actions were filed in six different
jurisdictions against both the manufacturer of the aircraft
and the airline.' 94 All claims were consolidated into one
proceeding for pretrial and trial purposes.' 9 5 The pri-
mary issue involved in the case was the availability of pu-
nitive damages. 96  The court began its opinion by
analyzing the interests of the relevant states in applying
their laws regarding the availability of punitive damages.
The court held that all the involved states had an interest
in having their laws applied and, thus, a true conflict ex-
isted. 197 Because of the multidistrict aspect of the pro-
ceeding, the court reviewed each claim with reference to
the choice of law rules used in each of the six original
forums.99
The court applied the most significant relationship test
of the Restatement (Second) to those actions originally filed
in Illinois."' In reviewing the contacts listed in Section
145, the court determined that the significant contacts
were the place of the alleged misconduct of both defend-
ants and their principal places of business.2 0 0 The court
also considered the place where the relationship of the
parties was centered a significant contact but found that
location unclear2 0 ' and, therefore, did not include it in its
192 Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 340. "Since federal
subject matter jurisdiction arises from the parties' diversity of citizenship, this
Court must follow the choice of law rules of the states where the various actions
were originally filed." Id.
193 644 F.2d at 594.
- Id. at 604. The original places of filing were Illinois, California, New York,
Michigan, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
195 Id. at 604 n. 1.
1, Id. at 604.
197 Id. at 608.
198 Id. at 610. "[S]ince federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,
the choice-of-law rules to be used are those choice-of-law rules of the states where
the actions were originally filed." Id.
- Id. at 611 (citing Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970) as
support).
- Id. at 612, 616.
201 Id.
final analysis.20 2
With respect to both defendants, the court held that of
the two states with the most significant contacts to the is-
sue, one state permitted punitive damages and the other
did not.20 3 Section 175 of the Restatement (Second) provides
that the law of the place of injury shall apply in wrongful
death actions unless another state has a more significant
relationship with the issue. 2 4 The court determined that,
because neither the place of the alleged misconduct nor
the principal place of business was any more significant
than the other, the interests of certainty, predictability,
uniformity and ease of application 20 5 dictated that the law
of the place of injury would control on this issue.20 6
Based on Illinois law, the court held that punitive dam-
ages would not be available for those claims originally
filed in Illinois.2 °7
The court next applied the governmental-interest, com-
parative impairment analysis to the issue for those claims
originally filed in California.20 8 With respect to each de-
fendant, the state in which the alleged misconduct oc-
curred and the state of the principal place of business
both had an equally strong interest in having their puni-
tive damages laws applied to the actions.2 0 9 The court
held that the principal place of business state had a strong
interest in its policy of denying punitive damages and that
202 Id.
203 Id. at 606-08.
2- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 175. "In an action for wrongful death, the local
law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship .... Id.
205 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 615. The court applied the princi-
ples set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6. See supra note 151 and accompanying
text.
2 0 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 615-16. The court held that,
although the place of injury was fortuitous, Illinois nevertheless had "very strong
interests in not suffering air crash disasters and also in promoting airplane safety"
and that the state had expended significant amounts of money in the cleanup ef-
fort. Id.
207 Id. at 616.
208 Id. at 621.
20- Id. at 623-24, 626-28.
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application of its rule would achieve that state's goal of
protecting corporate defendants from excessive
awards.21 0 On the other hand, the court found that the
policy of permitting punitive damages in the state in
which the alleged misconduct occurred could be achieved
"by means other than enforcement of the statute in ques-
tion," such as filing criminal charges against the manufac-
turer.21 ' Thus, the court held that the policy of denying
punitive damages would be most impaired if it were not
applied to the claims originally filed in California.2 12
The analysis of the claims from the remaining four ju-
risdictions was much less detailed. The court found that
New York's center of gravity test was similar to the most
significant relationship test used in Illinois.2 ' Therefore,
the court held that punitive damages also would not be
available for those claims originally filed in New York.2 14
With respect to the Michigan claims, the court found that
Michigan's choice of law rules were unclear but that given
its strong history of adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti,
a Michigan court facing these claims probably would ap-
ply the traditional rule.21 5 Since the place of injury was
Illinois, which does not permit recovery of punitive dam-
ages, no punitive damages were available to the Michigan
claimants. 6 The same analysis was applied to the Puerto
Rico claims since that jurisdiction clearly followed the
traditional rule. 17 Finally, for the Hawaii claims, the
court admitted that it could not clearly identify Hawaii's
210 Id. at 624, 627.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 625, 628.
2 3 Id. at 628 ("In BabcocA, the court.., announced a rule it viewed as equivalent
to the Restatement (Second)'s 'most significant relationship test.' " (citing Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749
(1963)).
214 Id. at 629.
21. Id. at 630. The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently abandoned the lex
loci delicti rule for the lexfori approach. See Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413
Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
21, Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 630.
217 Id. (citing Jiminez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 574 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1978)).
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choice of law rule.21 8 It held, therefore, that the law of the
original forum with respect to punitive damages should
be applied to these cases.2 19 Since Hawaii did not permit
punitive damages, those claimants who filed in Hawaii
were denied punitive damages.220
Similarly, in In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D. C. on
January 13, 1982, the court faced choice of law ques-
tions relating to the availability of punitive damages
against both the manufacturer and the air carrier in
wrongful death actions arising from claims originally filed
in eight different states representing three different
choice of law approaches.222 Relying on the precedent set
in Air Crash Disaster near Chicago,2 3 the court engaged in its
analysis of the issue in accordance with the choice of law
rules for each of the eight original forums, combining re-
view when those rules overlapped. 4 For those actions
originally filed in Pennsylvania, the court applied a com-
bined governmental-interest, most significant relationship
analysis. 225 The court held that among the interested
states, a true conflict was present because some interested
states denied punitive damages while others allowed
them. 2 6 In looking at the law of the original forum, as
dictated by the governmental-interest analysis, the court
held that Pennsylvania, the domicile of the decedents, had
no interest in the imposition of punitive damages against
nonresident defendants as long as the claimants were ade-
quately compensated for actual damages. 27
Having dispensed with the governmental-interest analy-
218 Id.
219 Id. at 631. "We conclude that where the choice-of-law cannot be deter-
mined, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court should presume
that the forum would apply its own law." Id.
220 Id.
22, 559 F. Supp. at 333.
22" Id. at 339.
223 644 F.2d at 610-11.
24 Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 340, 352-62.
22 Id. at 354.
226 Id. at 347-48.
227 Id. at 354 (finding that Pennsylvania "would not be interested in the imposi-
tion of punitive damages in a case involving an out-of-state air crash").
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sis portion of Pennsylvania's choice of law rule, the court
then applied the most significant relationship test to the
issue. 28 In its discussion, the court included the claims
originally filed in Massachusetts because Massachusetts'
choice of law rule was also the most significant relation-
ship test.2 29 In applying the test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the court placed exclusive importance on weighing
the importance of the policies of the original forums and
other interested states. 230 By focusing on policy consider-
ations, the court's examination of the contacts of the vari-
ous states and parties to the issue is difficult to distinguish
from its application of the governmental-interest
analysis. 3'
After determining that the interests of the principal
place of business were not significant,2 32 the court ex-
amined the interests of the place of the alleged miscon-
duct of each defendant and the place of injury.233 With
respect to the claims against the first defendant, the air
carrier, the site of the alleged misconduct-the airport
from which the flight had originated seconds before it
crashed-was considered significant.23 4 The court held,
however, that although the airport was located in Virginia,
it was the District of Columbia's airport and the District
had concurrent jurisdiction over activities at the air-
port.23 5 Since the District of Columbia was also the site of
the accident, the court found that its interests were more
significant than those of Virginia, the nominal location of
the airport.2 36 Therefore, the court held that the District
228 Id. at 354-55.
229 Id. The court also extended the most significant relationship test to those
claims originally filed in Maryland. Id. at 361-62.
230 Id. at 355.
231 Id. at 353, 355-56.
232 Id. at 355-56.
233 Id.
234 Id.
25 Id. The court stated the "the District of Columbia shares with Virginia an
interest in the safe operation of the airport." In addition, the court noted that at
the time of the crash Virginia did not provide for punitive damages, Id. at 356.
23,6 Id. The court also found that "the fact that Virginia recently has changed its
position on the denial of punitive damages and now will permit an assessment
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of Columbia laws providing for punitive damages in
wrongful death actions would be available against this
defendant.237
The claims against the second defendant, the aircraft
manufacturer, also focused on the place of alleged mis-
conduct, in this case the place of manufacture of the air-
craft. 3 8 In an interesting analysis, the court held that
because the District of Columbia was the place of injury,
the inquiry regarding which state had the greater interest
in the issue of punitive damages would include two com-
ponents, "the state's connection with the defendant al-
leged to have caused the injury . . . and the state's
connection with the injury itself. ' 239 The court found that
Washington, the state in which the defendant's alleged
misconduct occurred, had a strong policy of not permit-
ting punitive damages in order to protect resident corpo-
rations from excessive liability. 4 ° It determined that the
state had consciously subordinated its residents' interest
in collecting punitive damages from tortious domestic
corporations. 24' The court concluded that while the state
may have made its decisions with respect to its own resi-
dents, "the sovereignty of other states prevents it from
placing on that scale the rights of those injured else-
where. ' 242 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the place of in-
jury had the greater interest in having its policy
permitting punitive damages applied. 43 With respect to
the remaining claims filed in other jurisdictions, the court
thereof is strongly suggestive that denying punitive damages was not a significant
policy of the Commonwealth at the time of the crash." Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 355-56 (finding that "it is evident that jurisdictions having a greater
interest in this issue would be those where the conduct or any non-fortuitous in-
jury took place").
2 Id. at 357.
240 Id. at 359.
241 Id. "While Washington State has made a considered choice not to allow the
assessment of punitive damages, that choice necessarily includes a balancing of
the interests of resident tortfeasors against the interests of that state in preventing




238 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
held that the original forums all nominally retained the
choice of law rule of lex loci delicti.244 This reasoning per-
mitted the court to apply the District of Columbia's law to
the remaining claims, with the result that the plaintiffs'
punitive damage claims were not barred.245
In both of these cases, the courts completely discounted
any interest of the state of domicile of the plaintiff.246 The
courts believed that a state of domicile had no interest in
imposing punitive damages because that state's interest in
a wrongful death action was limited to protecting the well-
being of the plaintiff2 47 The courts felt this wellbeing
would be adequately handled by an award of compensa-
tory damages. 248  Nevertheless, as between the state of
domicile and the place of injury, particularly when the
place of injury is purely fortuitous, it would be better
practice for the court to apply the law of the domicile of
the plaintiff.249 Although use of the law of the place of
injury undoubtedly makes the court's task simpler 2 50 it
places too much emphasis on the laws of a state having
little qualitative contact with the issues in the case.
244 Id. at 359-61. The court considered the laws of Virginia and Georgia. Id.
245 Id.
246 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 624; Air Crash Disaster at Washington,
D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 353.
2' E.g., Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 644 F.2d at 613. The court found that the
interests of the states of domicile were "limited to assuring that the plaintiffs are
adequately compensated for their injuries and that the proceeds of any award are
distributed to the appropriate beneficiaries." Id.
2" Id. "Once the plaintiffs are made whole by recovery of the full measure of
compensatory damages to which they are entitled under the law of their domi-
ciles, the interests of those states are satisfied." Id. See also Air Crash Disaster at
Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 353 (stating that the "primary purpose of impos-
ing punitive damage assessments is to punish egregious conduct of a defendant
... not to compensate a plaintiff"; therefore, "a state whose only connection with
this litigation is that it was the domicile of a plaintiff or victim has no interest in
the imposition of punitive damage liability"). But cf. Air Crash Disaster at Boston,
399 F. Supp. at 1112 (holding that domicile of decedent had a strong interest in
making sure that victims' families were afforded a complete ability to sue for both
punitive and compensatory damages).
249 See Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1112.
2-.0 See, e.g., Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 741-42 (expressing the court's frus-
tration at the problems involved in determining the domiciles of almost 200 per-
sons killed in the crash of a foreign airliner at a foreign airport).
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B. Statutes of Limitations and Borrowing Statutes
In choice of law problems, courts have traditionally cat-
egorized statutes of limitations as procedural matters.2 5'
This classification permits the forum to apply its own stat-
ute of limitations to any action before it, even when the
laws of another state are applied to the substantive is-
sues.2 52 The forum court will automatically use its statute
of limitations in two situations. First, if the cause of action
is barred under foreign law, but timely under the forum's
statute, the forum will permit the action to proceed. Sec-
ond, if the cause of action is barred under forum law, the
foreign statute of limitations is ignored, and the forum
will refuse to entertain the action.5 The rationale under-
lying this position is that "limitation periods reflect the
policy of the forum that substantial justice can be
achieved only within the [statute's] prescribed time
period." 25 4
Two exceptions to this policy have been developed ju-
dicially in most jurisdictions. If a statute of limitations is
specifically included in a statute creating the cause of ac-
tion, the limitations provision is considered substan-
tive.255 Likewise, if the statute of limitations itself relates
to a specific cause of action, it is viewed as substantive.25 6
In the event the forum determines that either exception is
applicable to the cause of action, it will apply the foreign
state's statute of limitations.27
25 See FIRST RESTATEMENT § 585. "All matters of procedure are governed by
the forum." Id. Furthermore, the FIRST RESTATEMENT posits that "[It]he court at
the forum determines according to its own Conflict of Laws rule whether a given
question is one of substance or procedure." Id. § 584. For a brief discussion of
the historical development of the distinction between substantive and procedural
issues resulting in statutes of limitations being categorized as procedural, see
Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 5, n.3.
252 Grossman, supra note 251, at 5, 11.
253 Id. at 11.
2- Id. See also FIRST RESTATEMENT § 603 & comment a, § 604.
2-15 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 47, at 57.
256 Id.
27 Grossman, supra note 251, at 12.
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Borrowing statutes have created a third exception. 58
These statutes allow the forum to borrow the shorter stat-
ute of limitations of another state and apply it to the cause
of action in the forum, regardless of which state's substan-
tive laws are applied to the issues. 25 9 Borrowing statutes
provide that a claim is barred in the forum if it is barred in
another jurisdiction, generally the jurisdiction in which
the claim arose or in which one or more parties reside.26 °
Borrowing statutes have been enacted in approximately
thirty-eight jurisdictions.26 '
The use of a borrowing statute allows the court to re-
solve some of the problems caused by indiscriminate ap-
plication of its own limitations period, such as flagrant
forum shopping. 262  Such a statute, however, may create
different problems by defeating an otherwise valid claim
simply because the action arose in a foreign jurisdiction
with a shorter limitations, period. 263  To counteract the
perceived inequities of both the traditional classification
of statutes of limitations and borrowing statutes, a new
section covering statutes of limitations was added to the
Restatement (Second) in 1988.21 The effect of the new Sec-
tion 142 is that, in those states adopting the section, stat-
utes of limitations will be treated as substantive issues in
choice of law situations, subject to analysis under the prin-
ciples of Section 6.265 Additionally, the courts in at least
2- R. WEiNTRAuB, supra note 47, at 58. "A common statutory exception to the
procedural treatment of statutes of limitations is the 'borrowing' statute." Id.
259 Id. "Such a statute borrows a statute of limitations of another jurisdiction
and makes the foreign statute applicable at the forum." Weintraub also points out
that "[w]hen the foreign statute of limitations is borrowed, it is interpreted and
applied as it would be in the state from which it is borrowed." Id. at 58, n.51.
2-0 Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 287, 298-99 (1960).
261 See Sedler, The Truly Disinterested Forum in the Conflict of Laws: Ratliffv. Cooper
Laboratories, 25 S.C.L. REV. 184, 186 (1973); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitations
and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 79, n.2 (1963).
262 See Ester, supra 262, at 40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 142 Comment b.
263 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 142 Comment b.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 142.
265 Id. "Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of
limitations is determined under the principles stated in § 6." Id. Subsection 2 of
§ 142 states:
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one state, New Jersey, which has no borrowing statute, re-
gard statute of limitations problems as substantive is-
sues. 2 6 6 This categorization permits New Jersey courts to
analyze such problems using a governmental-interest ap-
proach, just as they do for all substantive choice of law
problems.267
Statutes of limitations often play a critical role in mass
tort litigation. For example, traditional statutes of limita-
tions for physical injuries require a plaintiff to file suit
within a relatively short period of time after occurrence of
the incident giving rise to the injury.268 Many mass tort
actions involve physical injury or disease brought about
by exposure to a product, but the injury or disease does
not manifest itself until several years after exposure.269 If
the forum has a traditional statute of limitations and con-
siders its statute of limitations a procedural matter, a
cause of action for injuries occuring under these circum-
stances will be defeated, even though an identical claim
would go forward if brought in a different forum with a
longer limitations period.270
The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the
claim unless:
(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of
the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of
limitations of a state having a more significant relationship to the
parties and the occurrence.
Id.
Comment b to § 142 further indicates that "[i]n light of the recommendation of
this Section to give statutes of limitations the same analysis as other substantive
choice-of-law issues, borrowing statutes should probably either be repealed or
amended to conform to the policies of this Section." Id. § 142 Comment b.
2" See Pine v. Eli Lilly & Co., 201 N.J. Super. 186, 492 A.2d 1079 (N.J. Super.
A.D. 1985).
267 Id. at 186, 492 A.2d at 1082. "[Tlhe underlying analysis of whether New
Jersey should apply its limitations statute or that of the foreign state is essentially
akin to the 'governmental interest' test in resolving choice of substantive law is-
sues." Id.
2-See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (1984 and Supp. 1989) (two year limit on
causes of action begins to run as of the date of injury) (amended 1986 and modi-
fied for asbestos caused injuries by § 8.01-249(4)(Supp. 1989)).
269 See generally Comment, DES: The Patchwork Quilt of Tort Law, 2 N. ILL. U.L.
REV. 370, 372 n.8 (1982) (indicating that the symptoms of DES exposure do not
manifest themselves for at least ten years).
270 See Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905
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To counteract the harshness of traditional statutes of
limitations, a growing number of states have enacted or
implemented the so-called "discovery rule" for certain
classes of personal injury cases involving medical mal-
practice and products liability. 27' Although implementa-
tion of the discovery rule varies among jurisdictions,
generally the rule provides that a cause of action does not
arise until such time as the plaintiff knows or through rea-
sonable diligence should know that she has been injured
by the defendant's product.272 The statute of limitations
period then begins to run from that time. 27" Thus, a
plaintiff may be exposed to a product in utero and only
many years later develop a chronic or fatal illness as a re-
sult of such exposure. In a jurisdiction following the dis-
covery rule, the plaintiff will be able to proceed with her
cause of action following diagnosis of the illness, provided
the action is commenced within the time period provided
for in the statute. 74
(1981). The Virginia Supreme Court held that Virginia's two year statute of limi-
tations begins to run from the time plaintiff was injured and that the time "is to be
established from available competent evidence, produced by a plaintiff or a de-
fendant, that pinpoints the precise date of injury with a reasonable degree of med-
ical certainty." Id. This case has probably been overruled by implication by
passage of Virginia's discovery rule statute of limitations applicable only to asbes-
tos related illnesses. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(4) (Supp. 1989).
271 See, e.g. N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. § 214-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990):
[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages
for personal injury ... caused by the latent effects of exposure to any
substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within
the body ... must be commenced shall be computed from the date
of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when
through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have
been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.
Id.
272 See, e.g., Cathcart v. Keene Ind. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493
(Pa. Super. 1984) (interpreting the Pennsylvania two year statute of limitations to
accrue only when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his or her injury and
the likely cause); Jarusewicz v. Johns-Mansville Prod. Corp., 188 NJ. Super. 638,
458 A.2d 156 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (interpreting the New Jersey two year
statute of limitations to accrue only when the plaintiff knew or should have known
of his or her injury and the likely cause).
272 See, e.g., Kelly v. Johns-Manville Corp., 590 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
274 There are many cases supporting this conclusion. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co.
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1. Statutes of Limitations as Procedural Law
The tension between the traditional rule and the dis-
covery rule often arises in mass tort litigation when the
activity giving rise to the injury, such as a corporate deci-
sion to market a product later determined to cause severe
physical problems, 75 occurs in a state different from the
one in which the injury occurred. If one state follows the
traditional rule and the other follows the discovery rule,
and the forum views its statutes of limitations as a proce-
dural matter, the timeliness of the plaintiff's action will
depend solely on whether the forum is the state using the
discovery rule.
From the plaintiff's perspective, adoption of a discovery
rule statute of limitations, whether done judicially or by
legislation, has greatly enhanced mass tort litigation. Pro-
vided the plaintiff brings his claim within the applicable
time period after discovery of his injury, it will not be
barred on statute of limitations grounds, regardless of
when he was exposed to the product causing his injury.
Problems arise for the plaintiff, however, when the court
in which he has filed his claim concludes that his action
includes some out of state elements, requiring the court
to apply its state's borrowing statute to the statute of limi-
tations issue.276
Most borrowing statutes provide that another state's
statute of limitations should govern a cause of action if the
alleged injuries arose in the other state. 77 Reliance on a
borrowing statute involves a bifurcated approach for de-
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1975); Harig
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978); Raymond v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977).
275 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d
350 (1981) (plaintiff, an Illinois domiciliary, was injured by the defendant's prod-
ucts which had been manufactured in other states).
276 See, e.g., Nance v. Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 559 So.2d 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990). The court determined that Virginia had the most significant relationship
with the action and employed Florida's borrowing statute to apply Virginia's two
year statute of limitations resulting in the plaintiff's action being timebarred. Id.
277 See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5521(b) (1981). "The period of limitations ap-
plicable to a claim accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that pro-
1990] 243
244 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
termining the applicable statute of limitations.2 7 8 First,
the forum must decide where the cause of action arose or
accrued. When the forum views its borrowing statute as
procedural device, it will apply its own laws to determine
where the claim arose.279 Second, if the court determines
that the cause of action did arise in another state, it will
then employ its borrowing statute to apply the other
state's statute of limitations to the plaintiff's claim, pro-
vided that it is shorter than that of the forum.28 °
For example, in Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,28' both plain-
tiffs were exposed to DES in utero while their mothers were
residing in Missouri. 2  At the time of the action, one
plaintiff lived in Ohio and the other in California. Their
complaints were filed in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.28 3 In the district
court proceeding, the court held that Missouri's borrow-
ing statute should be applied to the plaintiffs' claims if
they originated in any other state.8 4 Although the court
granted summary judgment for some of the defendants
against only one of the plaintiffs, both sides requested
that the issue of the applicability of Missouri's borrowing
statute to the claims be certified for immediate appeal to
the court of appeals.28 5
The Eighth Circuit found that in ruling on this issue it
was obligated to apply Missouri law and that Missouri
viewed statute of limitations as procedural matters, gov-
vided or prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law
of this Commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim." Id.
278 See, e.g., Mitchell, 100 11. App. 3d at 485, 426 N.E.2d at 350.
279 Id., 426 N.E.2d at 360 (reaching the conclusion, however, that the forum's
borrowing statute was inapplicable because the cause of action arose in Illinois).
280 See Ester, supra note 262, at 66. Borrowing statutes, with few exceptions,
provide that "[ilf the forum's [statute of limitations] period has expired, plaintiff's
action is barred even though not barred by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
cause of action had its initial contact." Id.
28, 686 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982).
282 Id. at 644.
283 Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
2- Id. at 806.
28-, Renfroe, 868 F.2d at 645.
erned by Missouri law.286 According to Missouri's bor-
rowing statute, a claim that is barred by the laws of a state
"in which it originated" is also barred in the Missouri
courts.287 The court of appeals began its analysis of the
applicability of the borrowing statute by determining
where the plaintiffs' actions arose. The court held that a
claim originated where the last element of the cause of
action occurred.2 18 The plaintiffs claimed that their ac-
tions arose in the state in which they were exposed to
DES. The court found, however, that under Missouri law,
the last necessary element in a cause of action is a plain-
tiff's discovery of discernible damages. 89 In the case of
the plaintiffs in Renfroe, the court determined that the last
element was not present until the plaintiffs had learned of
their illnesses,2 90 and further that their claims did not ac-
crue until they knew or should have known that exposure
to DES had caused their injuries.2 9 ' Both plaintiffs discov-
ered their injuries while residing in other states.
Although one plaintiff was living in California when she
was diagnosed with cancer, the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that Missouri's borrowing statute
was inapplicable to her claims because she may have been
residing in Missouri when she discovered the link between
her cancer and DES. 92 In the case of the second plaintiff,
the court held that the Missouri borrowing statute did ap-
ply to her claims because she was living in Ohio when her
cancer was diagnosed and she discovered the link be-
286 Id, at 646 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)
and Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155, 1157-58 (W.D. Mo. 1969) as support).
287 Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.190 (Supp. 1990).
288 Renfroe, 686 F.2d at 647.
289 Id. ("According to Missouri law, a cause of action does not accrue until the
plaintiff has sustained at least some damage capable of ascertainment.")
2 Id. "When the cancer developed and became capable of ascertainment, the
final element of the cause of action occurred and [the plaintiffs'] respective causes
of action accrued ... ." Id.
291 Id. at 648 (approving the district court's holding that "the plaintiffs' causes
of action did not accrue until ... the plaintiffs knew or should have known that
DES caused their injuries").
292 Id.
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tween her cancer and DES in California. 3  The court ac-
cepted the district court's finding that it was impossible to
determine where this plaintiff's claims had accrued. 94
The court of appeals then approved the lower court's de-
cision to examine both Ohio's and California's statutes of
limitations to determine whether either would allow the
plaintiff's action to proceed. 295  The court found that
while California's statute would bar all of the plaintiff's
claims, Ohio's would permit some of them. 96
Revival statutes have been enacted in some states2 97 to
counteract the harsh results of a statute of limitations seen
as barring otherwise valid claims for injuries with long la-
tency periods 9  The ability of a plaintiff to rely on a revi-
val statute to bring an otherwise timebarred claim, often
hinges on a court's application of its borrowing statute to
determine whether its own statute of limitations should
apply or whether that of another state is more appropri-
ate. 99 In two recent cases, courts in New York have
reached different conclusions in applying that state's revi-
val statute to actions for injuries resulting from exposure
to toxic substances.3 0 0
-s Id. at 649.
294 Id.
295 Id.
2- Renfroe, 686 F.2d at 651.
-7 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990). The
statute provides that an action for personal injuries caused by latent effects of
certain types of toxic substances "which was barred as of the effective date of this
act or which was dismissed prior to the effective date of this act solely because the
applicable period of limitations has or had expired is hereby revived," for a period
of one year. Id.
208 See, e.g., Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 146 A.D.2d 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d
734, 737 (Sup. Ct. A.D. 1989) ("[Tlhe revival statute is concerned solely with the
harshness of a time-bar that focused on a victim's exposure to a toxic
substance.").
2"9 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Meehan, 523 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1988) (applying the
Florida borrowing statue to permit the plaintiff to take advantage of New York's
revival statute, allowing him to go forward with his suit for personal injuries suf-
fered as a result of exposure to asbestos).
3- Compare Besser, 146 A.D.2d at 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (applying New York's
borrowing statute to defeat the plaintiff's claim under New York's revival statute)
with Scalone v. Celotex Corp., 718 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New
York's borrowing statute to permit the plaintiff's claim under New York's revival
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In Besser v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. ,301 a New York state
court found that a plaintiff whose injuries occurred out of
state could not rely on the revival statute to reinstate her
initial complaint even though she filed her initial com-
plaint in New York.3 °2 The plaintiff was a resident of New
York when she filed her second suit although she had
been a non-resident at the time of her original com-
plaint.3 0 3 The court found that the purpose behind enact-
ment of the revival statute is to provide a bridge between
New York's older strict statute of limitations and its newly
enacted discovery statute of limitations.3° In effect, the
revival statute permits plaintiffs with otherwise timebar-
red claims the same opportunity to bring a claim for per-
sonal injuries caused by toxic substances as a plaintiff with
newly discovered injuries.305
The court determined that the legislative intent of the
revival statute is to provide a window for timebarred
claims only for injuries arising within the state. 6 Since
plaintiff's injuries occurred out of state, the court held
that the revival statute did not apply to her claim, despite
the fact that she filed her original claim in New York. 0 7
The court apparently believed the plaintiff had moved to
New York solely for the purpose of taking advantage of
the revival statute.30 8 The court took the position that to
allow the plaintiff's claim under these circumstances
would encourage forum shopping.30 9
statute), and Meehan, 523 So.2d at 141 (applying Florida's borrowing statute to
permit the plaintiff's claim under New York's revival statute).
30, 146 A.D.2d at 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
302 Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
303 Id.
s- Id. The statute's "focus was on the elimination of New York's 'last exposure'
rule and the adoption of a 'discovery' statute of limitations." Id.
305 Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
Id. "The Legislature's remedial purpose was merely to remove the obstacle
of the last exposure rule." Id.
307 Id.
-8 Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
- Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 738 ("New York residents ... will have access to the
New York courts, while nonresident plaintiffs will be barred from forum
shopping.").
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More importantly, however, the court relied on New
York's borrowing statute for support of its position.3 '0
The court held that when a nonresident brings his or her
claim in New York, the court hearing the complaint is ob-
ligated to apply the statute of limitations of the state in
which either the injury occurred or was discovered.1
Shortly after the decision in Besser, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York faced an application of
New York's revival statute to a claim brought by a nonres-
ident for injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos
products in New York. In Scalone v. Celotex Corp.,31 the
court held that nonresidents may rely on the benefits of
the statute when the injuries are alleged to have occurred
within New York. 3'3 The court allowed the plaintiff's ac-
tion to go forward despite the fact that his original com-
plaint had been filed in New Jersey and had apparently
been dismissed there as timebarred under that state's stat-
ute of limitations.1 4 In dismissing the defendant's argu-
ment that the court should rely on New York's borrowing
statute in determining when the plaintiff's cause of action
arose for statute of limitations purposes, the court found
the interaction between the revival statute and the bor-
rowing statute requires New York's statute of limitations
to be applied for injuries occurring within the state 1 5
rather than the law of the state where the action
accrued. 1 6
2. Statutes of Limitations as Substantive Law
Section 142 of the Restatement (Second) was recently re-
vised to provide for treatment of statutes of limitations
choice of law issues in the same manner as substantive law
,1o Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
- Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
312 718 F. Supp. at 215.
"- Id. at 216.
314 Id.
3-5 Id. at 217.
31 Id. The court concluded that for purposes of the revival statute, the place of
accrual is the same as the place of injury. ld.
problems.1 7 Adoption of the Restatement (Second)'s posi-
tion would allow courts more flexibility in determining
the appropriate statute of limitations when more than one
state has some relationship with the cause of action, even
if the forum has enacted a borrowing statute. In Bates v.
Cook, Inc. ,318 the Florida Supreme Court approved the use
of Section 142 and associated commentary for resolving
statute of limitations and borrowing statute choice of law
issues.3 t9
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Bates
holding to a mass tort litigation action involving injuries
resulting from exposure to asbestos-based products. In
Celotex Corp. v. Meehan,s2 ° the court jointly considered
three separate actions, although most of its analysis was
devoted to Mr. Meehan's claim. The court began its dis-
cussion by explaining the Bates decision and reiterating its
commitment to analyzing statute of limitations and bor-
rowing statute issues using the most significant relation-
ship criteria set out in Section 145 of the Restatement
(Second).32'
The court identified New York and Florida as states
with possible contacts to the plaintiff's cause of action.
Applying the contacts listed in Section 145, the court
found that the place of the injury causing conduct, the
plaintiff's domicile at the time of exposure to the asbestos
products, the defendant's principal place of business, and
the place where the parties relationship of employer-em-
ployee was centered were all in New York. 22 Florida's
31 For a discussion of Section 142 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), see supra
notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
3, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1987).
319 Id. at 1114-15. The court held that "just as in the case of other issues of
substantive law, the significant relationships test should be used to decide con-
flicts of law questions concerning the statute of limitations .... The borrowing
statute will only come into play if it is determined that the cause of action arose in
another state." Id.
3- 523 So.2d at 141.
321 Id. at 144. "In view of our Bates decision, the application of [Florida's bor-
rowing statute] is not clearly dependent on whether there are significant relation-
ships which establish that the cause of action arose in another state." Id.
322 Id. at 146.
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only contact was that it was the state in which the plain-
tiff's injury manifested itself and was diagnosed. 2 3 The
court held that, considering alf the circumstances, New
York had a more significant relationship with the plain-
tiff's claim.3 24
Based on its holding, the court concluded that the cause
of action arose in New York and, therefore, it was appro-
priate to employ Florida's borrowing statute to apply New
York's statute of limitations.3 25 At the time the plaintiff
filed his claim, the New York statute required the action to
be filed within three years after his last exposure to the
asbestos products.3 26 The court determined that under
New York law, Florida's borrowing statute barred the
plaintiff's action. 27 The court allowed the claim to pro-
ceed, however, under the provisions of New York's revival
statute which became effective while the plaintiff's appeal
was pending before the court.32 8
For many years, the courts in New Jersey have treated
statute of limitations issues in the same manner as sub-
stantive choice of law problems. In Heavner v. Uniroyal,
Inc. ,329 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that it would
no longer treat statute of limitation problems as proce-
dural matters in causes of action involving application of
another state's substantive law. 33 0 Although the court did
not fully develop its methodology, it concluded that when
New Jersey has no interest in a cause of action other than
as that of the forum, a New Jersey court will not apply its
"23 Id.
324 Id ("In our opinion, the criteria clearly show that New York has the signifi-
cant relationship with Meehan.").
323 Id.
326 Id. at 145. The court found that "[u]nder New York law in effect at the time
this claim was filed... Meehan's cause of action arose and accrued in 1944, the
final year of Meehan's employment in the Brooklyn shipyards. Further, the New
York statute of limitations expired in 1947 . . . [and] New York had expressly
rejected the discovery standard." Id.
327 Id. at 146.
328 Id. For a discussion of New York's revival statute see supra notes 298-317
and accompanying text.




statute of limitation and allow the action to proceed when
it would be barred in another state having an interest in
the outcome of the action. 33 ' This position is consistent
with New Jersey's use of governmental-interest analysis
for resolving substantive choice of law issues.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals faced a conflicting
statutes of limitations issue in Henry v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. 33 2 In this case, the court had to decide whether Que-
bec's or New Jersey's statute of limitations applied to a
case involving birth defects caused by thalidomide, a drug
manufactured in New Jersey but ingested by the plaintiff's
mother in Quebec.3 3 3 The New Jersey statute of limita-
tions tolled a cause of action for a minor until he reached
the age of twenty-one.3 3 4 The Quebec statute required
the action to be brought within two years of the date of
injury, which in this action was two years from the date
plaintiff's mother ingested the thalidomide.35
Rather than dismissing the case on grounds offorum non
conveniens as other courts in similar situations have
done," 6 the court reviewed the issue by application of
NewJersey's governmental-interest analysis.33 7 The court
found that even though the product had perhaps been
produced and tested in New Jersey,38 the fact that the
drug had been taken in Quebec pursuant to a prescription
provided by a Quebec physician, coupled with the fact
that the plaintiff was a lifetime resident of Quebec,
pointed to a greater governmental interest on the part of
Quebec.3 3 9 The court also reviewed the competing poli-
"' Id. 305 A.2d at 414.
508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
33 Id.
,4 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:14-21 (1987). The statute calls for a tolling of causes of
action for personal injury until a minor reaches the age of twenty-one. Id.
" QUE. REV. STAT. art: 2262 (1972).
536 See, e.g., Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984).
:37 Henty, 508 F.2d at 35-36.
- Id. at 31.
-19 Id. at 35. At some point, one of the defendant's subsidiaries produced the
active ingredient of the defendant's brand of thalidomide in New Jersey. The
court found that this was insufficient to provide New Jersey with an interest in the
action because the defendant was a nationwide corporation with "more substan-
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cies behind both statutes of limitations and determined
that New Jersey's interest in its tolling provision was not
intended for extension to distant plaintiffs "whose legisla-
ture had failed to afford similar protection.11 4 °  New
Jersey's interest, therefore, was found insufficient to war-
rant application of its statute of limitations. 4 '
The policies behind statutes of limitations and borrow-
ing statutes are to bar stale claims and to prevent forum
shopping.3 42 Borrowing statutes are effective in promot-
ing these policies because they invariably require use of
the shorter of the two statutes of limitations under consid-
eration by the forum court.3 4 3 In the absence of a borrow-
ing statute, it is unclear whether application of the
Restatement (Second)'s Section 142 will accomplish the same
goals. If the state with the more significant relationship to
the action has a longer statute of limitations, use of Sec-
tion 142 would require the forum to employ that statute,
resulting in the action proceeding when it may have been
barred by the forum's own statute of limitations. New
Jersey's approach to these problems is similar to that of
Section 142 even though a different choice of law ap-
proach is utilized. In at least one case,344 this has resulted
in a New Jersey court being willing to entertain use of a
tial activity in other places." Id. at 36. In addition, the court found that New
Jersey was only one of forty-one states in which the defendant tested thalidomide.
"New Jersey testing simply did not give the State an interest in applying its prod-
uct liability law to these plaintiffs." Id. at 37.
340 Id.
34' Id. "We conclude that a NewJersey court, confronted with these facts would
deem itself a disinterested forum and apply the law of Quebec to dismiss this suit
as timebarred." Id. The court of appeals also explicitly concluded that "[aibsent
a finding that New Jersey substantive law applies, Heavner requires borrowing of
the foreign limitation period." Id.
-42 See Ross v.Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1985). "One of the
major objectives in enacting a limitations statute is to protect defendants and the
local courts against the prosecution of stale claims." Id. at 827. See also Henry,
508 F.2d at 37. "To apply New Jersey's tolling provision here would violate [the
principle] that forum shopping should be discouraged by litigants with slender
ties to New Jersey." Id.
'4- For a discussion of borrowing statutes, see supra notes 259-262 and accom-
panying text.
344 Pine, 201 N.J. Super. at 186, 492 A.2d at 1079.
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longer statute of limitations, even though in that case, the
longer time period was part of the forum's statute.345
C. The Availability of a Cause of Action
In many mass tort actions, courts face the question of
which state's substantive theories for recovery will govern
the action. Often, the plaintiff has worked in one or more
states, but is domiciled in another when the injury com-
plained of manifests itself.346 This issue frequently arises
in product liability cases, an area in which many states
have developed novel theories of recovery to deal with the
prevalent problems of long latency periods and inability
to identify the actual manufacturer of the product causing
the injury.347 In addition, several states do not recognize
strict products. liability actions, but rely instead on theo-
ries of negligence. 4 8
In Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the Missouri state
court faced a typical choice of law dilemma in determining
whether the plaintiff could bring a strict products liability
345 Id., 492 A.2d at 1080. The issue before the court was "whether New Jersey,
the forum State, should apply its statute of limitations ... when the underlying
wrongful act occurred in New York, while plaintiff was a New York domiciliary"
who moved to New Jersey and filed his complaint after New York's statute of limi-
tations had expired. Id. The court held that assuming the plaintiff was a New
Jersey domiciliary at the time his action was filed, New Jersey had "a sufficient
state governmental interest in the compensation of its domiciliaries to apply its
statute of limitations," thereby allowing the action to proceed. Id.
346 See, e.g., Seckular v. Celotex, 209 NJ. Super. 242, 507 A.2d 290 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (plaintiff was domiciled in Florida when he discovered injuries
resulting from asbestos exposure in New York); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (plaintiff lived in Kansas but suffered his injuries from
exposure to asbestos primarily when working in Missouri).
,47 For example, courts have recognized the following theories of recovery for
DES exposure injuries: concert of action, see, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich.
311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984); enterprise liability, see, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); and market
share liability, see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
-8 See, e.g. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980)
(North Carolina declined to adopt RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965)).
549 673 S.W.2d at 434.
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action under Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 402A. 5°
Such an action is permitted under Missouri law, but not
under Kansas law.35 1 The plaintiff had worked for many
years with asbestos-based products in Missouri and else-
where.352 At the time he was diagnosed as having asbesto-
sis, he was domiciled in Kansas. 353  The defendant
manufactured and sold asbestos-based products to the
plaintiff's employers in Missouri. 54
The defendant took the position that Kansas law should
apply to the plaintiff's cause of action, while the plaintiff
believed that Missouri law should be applied.355 Under
Kansas law, the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's in-
juries only if the defendant knew or should have known
that its products were unreasonably dangerous at the time
they were sold to the plaintiff's employers.356 Missouri,
on the other hand, had adopted the strict products liabil-
ity rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A3 7
which permitted recovery on a showing only that the de-
fendant sold a defective product which was unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer who was ultimately injured by
that product .35  The plaintiff was not required to show
35- See infra note 359 for the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
3' Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 437-38.
35-2 Id. at 437.
35' Id.
3- Id. at 435.
--5 Id. Kansas permitted a defendant to plead a state of the art defense in a
products liability action based on a failure-to-warn theory. In this case, the plain-
tiff proceeded under the inherently dangerous product theory of Section 402A of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, a theory which apparently would not have
been available if Kansas law had been applied to the cause of action.
-s Id. at 436 ("[U]nder Kansas law plaintiffs must prove that at the time defend-
ant sold Kaylo it knew or could have known that the product was unreasonably
dangerous, and that an alternative safe design was technically feasible.")
357 Id, at 437 (citing Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
1969) and making reference to the fact that Missouri Supreme Court had previ-
ously adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A for product liability
cases).
's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
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that the manufacturer knew or should have known at the
time of sale that the product was defective. 5 9
The court applied the Missouri most significant rela-
tionship test to resolve this choice of law problem. 360 The
court found that the most significant contact was the place
where the relationship between the parties was cen-
tered.3 6 l Since the plaintiff came in contact with defend-
ant's products while working for several employers in
Missouri, that state's law was the most appropriate one to
apply to the plaintiff's action.362 Thus, plaintiff was able
to proceed under the theory which afforded him the easier
standard of proof to meet.363
The court in Baroldy v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,364 also
applied the most significant relationship test to a similar
problem.365  Here, the plaintiff was stricken with toxic
shock syndrome after use of the defendant's birth control
device. 66 The injury occurred while she was living in
North Carolina but domiciled in Arizona. 67 The defend-
ant's principal place of business and the location where its
corporate decisions were made about the type of warnings
to include in the product's accompanying brochure were
both in New Jersey. 68 The court grouped the New Jersey
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
Id.
359 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (Section 1 of § 402A ap-
plies even if "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product.").
s- Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 437.
36, Id. at 437. The court stated that "of the contacts listed under subsection 2
of § 145, 'the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered'
has the greatest relative importance with respect to the particular issue." Id.
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws).
-62 Id. The court completely discounted the significance of the plaintiff's domi-
cile. "A disease, however, has no significant relationship to the place of one's
residence; it goes with the victim wherever he goes." Id.
36 Id,
"- 157 Ariz. 574, 760 P.2d 574 (1988).
.65 Id., 760 P.2d at 579.
m66 Id., 760 P.2d at 577.
$67 Id.
3- Id., 760 P.2d at 479.
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and Arizona contacts because the two states' product lia-
bility laws were identical and, thus, presented no conflict
for the court to resolve. 369 The court held that the place
of the plaintiff's domicile was the state with the most sig-
nificant contact to the injury.3 70 It justified its position by
first determining that the place where the parties' rela-
tionship was centered, North Carolina, was completely
fortuitous, in that the plaintiff could have decided to use
the defendant's product anywhere.3  Second, the court
determined that Arizona had the greater interest in the
well being of its domiciliaries who, if not adequately com-
pensated, could end up as wards of the state. 72
The court also applied the "choice-influencing" princi-
ples of the Restatement (Second)'s Section 6 "relevant to
choosing the applicable rule of law."' 373 The court found
that the most important of these factors was Arizona's
strong governmental policy of protecting its domiciliaries
from the harms associated with defective products.7
North Carolina's policy of protecting its resident corpo-
rate defendants from liability by declining to adopt a strict
products liability cause of action did not extend to the de-
fendant, a nonresident defendant. 75 Combining its anal-
yses under both sections of the Restatement (Second), the
court held that Arizona's substantive law would be ap-
plied to the plaintiff's action. 76 As a result, the plaintiff
-9 Id. The court also relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145 comment i, stat-
ing that this comment indicated "that, when the law of two states does not con-
flict, the contacts from those two states should be considered as if they were from
the state involved in the choice of law question." Id.
-70 Id. The court stated that "[in § 145 analyses, the domicile of the plaintiff
often carries the greatest weight." Id.
.71 Id., 760 P.2d at 578-79 ("[Allthough the 'place of injury' was North Caro-
lina, the location was a mere happenstance.").
'37 Id. "Arizona has an interst in insuring that its injured residents do not be-
come wards of the state." Id.
"73 Id., 760 P.2d at 579-80.
I74 d., 760 P.2d at 580 ("Arizona has adopted §§ 402A and 402B [of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] to protect its citizens from defective products by




was able to rely on the strict products liability theory of
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A3 77 instead of on
the traditional negligence theory used in North Carolina
which would have required her to prove that the defend-
ant knew or should have known its product was dangerous
or defective.3
A comparison of Elmore and Baroldy indicates that even
when courts differ on the contact to be considered most
significant in a mass tort action, the result of the court's
finding is generally that which benefits the plaintiff. This
was not, however, the result in In re Bendectin Litigation,379
a multidistrict action. Some of the actions had been vol-
untarily filed by in state and out of state plaintiffs in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio. Others had been transferred to that court by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. All actions were
consolidated for pretrial and trial purposes. 8 °
At issue in Bendectin Litigation was the question of which
party had the burden of proving proximate causation in a
products liability action in which the plaintiffs alleged that
their mothers' ingestion of the defendant's drug, Bendec-
tin, during pregnancy resulted in severe birth defects to
the plaintiffs.3 8 Under Ohio law, the burden of proof on
the issue of proximate cause was on the plaintiffs.3 2
Under the laws of other jurisdictions, the burden of proof,
depending on the nature of the plaintiffs' claims, was on
the defendant.38 3 In the original proceeding, the district
court had held that all substantive law issues would be
37 Id.
37, Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to recognize any doc-
trine of strict liability in products liability actions. Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v.
Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp., 63 N.C. App. 503, 304 S.E.2d 773 (1983).
379 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, sub nom. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 788 (1989).
38o 857 F.2d at 294-95.
38, Id. at 293.
392 Id. at 303.
3 Id. at 302-03.
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governed by the laws of Ohio. 8 4
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the burden of
proof issue should be resolved according to their respec-
tive states of residence.3 85 The court of appeals, however,
held that determination of the appropriate substantive law
should be determined by application of Ohio's most sig-
nificant relationship test. 38 6 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs' domiciles were not a significant contact since, in
each case, the state of domicile at the time the action had
little or no relationship to the place where the drug was
taken.a 7 Rather, the court held that the place with the
most significant relationship to the action was Ohio, the
state in which the defendant had manufactured and dis-
tributed the drug.3 8 8 The court further found that Ohio's
relationship was significant because corporate decisions
about issuing warnings and instructions for use of the
drug had occurred there.38 9
The court acknowledged that the dictates of Klaxon re-
quired it to apply the choice of law rules of each of the
transferor courts.3 90  The court apparently determined
that this would be an overwhelming task, holding, instead,
that it was unnecessary to do so because no true conflict
existed "where another state's choice of law rules would
have applied the substantive law of Ohio to this case." '39'
As a result of the court of appeals' holdings, under Ohio
384 Id. at 295. A number of plaintiffs opted out of the proceeding after the dis-
trict court ruled on this issue. Id.
383 Id. at 302.
386 Id. at 304 ("Applying Klaxon here, it is apparent that it is Ohio's conflict of
laws rules that must normally determine which substantive law should govern the
rights of the parties.").
,,7 Id. at 305. "[Tjhe state of domicile at the time of the suit may bear little or
no relation to where a mother may have taken a morning sickness drug years
before." She might have taken it "while traveling in many different states." Id.
588 "We, however, see the law of the state of manufacture of the product as
being more significant in this type of case .... [The defendant] manufactured [in
Ohio] a uniform drug internationally." Id. In addition, the court found that
"[s]tandards against which defendant's wrongful or negligent conduct may have
been measured are also set by Ohio and federal law." Id.
389 Id




substantive law, 92 the plaintiffs had the burden of proof
in showing that the defendant's anti-nausea drug was the
proximate cause of their birth defects, something no
plaintiff was able to show.393
IV CONCLUSION
At least five approaches are employed by courts for
resolving choice of law problems. In addition, several
states combine two or more of these approaches in mak-
ing decisions on the appropriate law to be applied to a
cause of action involving multistate elements. As a result,
it is not uncommon to find different conclusions reached
about actions involving similar facts.
Use of the traditional lex loci delicti rule appears, initially,
to achieve the most predictable results. A court applying
this rule need only determine the state in which the plain-
tiff's injury occurred and, then, apply the law of that state
to the plaintiff's claim. Among jurisdictions using the
traditional rule, however, differing results are reached de-
pending on the factors used for ascertaining the place of
injury. For example, in asbestos-related cases, some
courts have determined that the plaintiff's last place of ex-
posure to asbestos was the place where his injury oc-
curred. Others, relying to some extent on the discovery
rule statute of limitations, have concluded that the place
of injury was the state in which the plaintiff's injury mani-
fested itself and was diagnosed. Still other courts have
held that the place of injury was that in which the injury
came to light, was diagnosed, and was linked to exposure
to asbestos-based products.
The governmental-interest analysis provides a seem-
ingly more flexible and modern method for resolving
choice of law problems. The approach allows the forum
court to apply the law of the state having the greatest in-
terest in the action and the consequences of its outcome.
392 Id. at 311 (even under a strict liability action for a defective product, under
Ohio law plaintiff has the burden of proving proximate causation).
303 Id.
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Use of the analysis as originally formulated, however,
would result in application of the forum's law in almost
every instance. As long as the forum has some interest,
however incidental, in having one of its policies recog-
nized, the interest of another state, no matter how strong,
may be ignored. Additionally, the analysis relies on the
notion that each state's interest is readily discernible
when, in fact, the forum often relies on its own percep-
tions of the interests behind the conflicting laws under
consideration.
When it was first devised, the center of gravity test was
heralded as a revolutionary approach for resolving choice
of law issues. The courts in New York, however, have
been unable to agree on a consistent method for applying
the test. Originally, the New York courts considered all
the contacts of each potentially involved state on both a
qualitative and a quantitative basis. Today, the courts
have reduced the test to one of simply counting up the
number of contacts each state has with the action. The
state with the greatest number of contacts, regardless of
the relative importance of those contacts, is selected as
the center of gravity whose substantive law will be applied
to the plaintiff's claim.
The choice-influencing factors approach is the broadest
policy-based choice of law solution. In tort actions, appli-
cation of this approach is similar to that of the govern-
mental-interest analysis in that the forum court focuses on
the relative interests of each state to the issue involved.
The court then considers the importance of these inter-
ests to the action itself and, when appropriate, selects
what it considers to be the better rule of law for applica-
tion to the plaintiff's action. The ability of the court to
make this type of decision gives it a stronger, more active
role in making choice of law decisions. On the other
hand, it may be viewed as a judicial encroachment on an
essentially legislative function.
Many courts have adopted the most significant relation-
ship test of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws for
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resolving choice of law problems. This test is intended to
provide a court with flexibility and alternatives in making
choice of law decisions. The court is instructed to deter-
mine the contacts each state may have with the parties and
the action and the relative significance of those contacts to
the issues. Then the court is to evaluate the significance
of the contacts in light of several overriding principles,
such as the relative importance of the policies of the fo-
rum and other interested states to the action.
From a review of the decisions employing the most sig-
nificant relationship test, two major problems become ap-
parent. First, different courts favor the importance of
different contacts in making choice of law decisions in ac-
tions involving very similar facts. Some courts stress the
importance of the plaintiff's state of domicile in insuring
that its resident plaintiffs are adequately compensated for
their injuries. Other courts emphasize the significance of
the state in which the injurious product was manufac-
tured. Still others stress the place of injury as the state
with the most significant relationship to the action. Such
varying standards inevitably lead to different, inconsistent
results in similar mass tort actions.
Second, courts often ignore the importance of applying
the overriding principles. Rather, the analysis ends after
the court decides which contact it considers the most im-
portant based on specified criteria. It remains unclear
whether such an incomplete analysis has impacted the
outcome of decisions employing the most significant rela-
tionship test.
Finally, regardless of which approach is used for analyz-
ing choice of law issues, the decisions indicate that many
courts fail to apply the appropriate test accurately. Often,
in multidistrict litigation, the forum court considers only
its own approach, neglecting to apply the transferring fo-
rums' choice of law tests to those actions originally filed in
those forums. In other cases, most notably those applying
New York's center of gravity test, the courts have appar-
ently concluded that the place of injury is the center of
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gravity, rather than considering the importance of other
contacts, such as the place the product or drug was manu-
factured or the state of the plaintiff's domicile. Inaccu-
racy is a particular problem in the federal courts which
often do not fully investigate the choice of law approaches
of the states in which they sit.
The issues presented in this Comment will continue to
be important in mass tort litigation. Daily, new actions
are filed as more toxic substances are found to have con-
taminated ground water supplies. Air crash disasters will
surely involve complex litigation for many years to come.
Finally, manufacturers will continue to produce products
that, in future years, will be determined to be unreasona-
bly dangerous. The courts, particularly those at the fed-
eral level, will need to be versed in the use of choice of
law approaches, not only their own, but also those em-
ployed in other jurisdictions in order to avoid reaching
anomalous results in mass tort litigation actions.
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